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Abstract 
 
It is essential that a defendant’s fitness to plead be accurately assessed In 
order to ensure that those who are unable to effectively participate in their trial 
are not required to do so. With a mandate from the Law Commission, a new 
measure, the ‘FTP’ has been developed; this measure is designed to assess 
fitness to plead in terms of the defendant’s decision-making capacity. What 
has not been determined to date is whether this new measure is vulnerable to 
attempts at malingering. The current study is an investigation of the FTP’s 
effectiveness in detecting malingering, as well as an exploration of the 
sample’s understanding of fitness to plead and how this could potentially be 
malingered.  
 
This study employed a between- subjects, double-blind, mixed-methods 
design, involving two groups: simulated malingerers group and a control 
group. Sixty-four students were recruited to this study, primarily via a research 
credit participation scheme. All participants completed the FTP measure and 
the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM). The RSPM was used as 
a criterion measure of malingering. Participants also answered qualitative 
questions regarding their understanding of fitness to plead and their simulated 
profile of unfitness.  
 
Results indicated that the FTP’s malingering items were not sensitive to 
attempts at malingering; Content Analysis revealed that participants primarily 
indicated mental health problems, and to a lesser extent, cognitive difficulties 
as the reasons someone would be found unfit to plead; the most commonly 
attempted means of malingering was that of malingered cognitive impairment. 
Recommendations are offered to assist clinicians in detecting malingering 
while using the FTP, and the clinical and theoretical implications of the current 
study’s results are described.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction to Research 
 
The Criminal Justice system of England and Wales comprises various 
agencies, including the police, the prosecution service, the courts, the 
probation service and prisons. Collectively, their central purpose is to deliver 
justice, by means of convicting and punishing the guilty, preventing re-
offending, while protecting innocent parties and ensuring fairness (Office for 
Criminal Justice Reform, 2007).  
There are two primary types of courts within the Criminal Justice system, 
namely the Magistrates Courts (comprising  Adult and Youth Courts) and the 
Crown Court. Magistrates Courts typically deal with less serious criminal 
offences, such as theft, whereas the Crown Court deals with the most serious 
or ‘indictable’ offences, such as murder or rape; a jury is present in a Crown 
Court trial only (Judiciary, 2016).  
 
The present research is concerned specifically with one aspect of Crown 
Court trials1, and that is the determination of whether or not a defendant is ‘fit 
to plead’. If a defendant’s fitness is questioned pre-trial, by either the 
prosecution, defence or the Judge, a fitness to plead hearing takes place; 
within this hearing, the Judge will consider expert evidence from two or more 
registered medical practitioners regarding the defendant’s fitness to plead 
1 T here are no specific procedures  for determining fitnes s  to plead in the Magis trates  C ourts  at pres ent 
(B evan, 2014).  
7 
 
                                            
before making their decision as to whether the defendant is unfit or not 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2012). As one or more of the registered 
practitioners must be ‘duly approved’ as having special experience in the 
diagnosis/treatment of mental disorder, currently, such evidence is typically 
provided by psychiatrists (Law Commission, 2010).  
 
A registered medical practitioner providing this expert evidence is expected to 
rely upon specific criteria in order to come to their decision regarding fitness to 
plead. However, as the Introduction will explore, the area of fitness to plead 
assessment is one which is currently in flux, as not only are these criteria 
currently being re-defined, specifically in terms of the defendant’s decision-
making capacity, but the question of whether or not a psychologist can be 
formally approved to provide evidence relating to fitness to plead alongside 
psychiatrists is also receiving considerable attention (Law Commission, 2012).  
   
One aspect of the fitness to plead assessment process which has often been 
neglected in the literature is the possibility of a defendant malingering 
unfitness. As a finding of unfitness to plead precludes a prison sentence, with 
the possible outcomes for the defendant comprising absolute discharge, a 
supervision order or a treatment order, a defendant may be motivated to 
malinger by the likelihood of potentially receiving a more ‘lenient’ sentence. As 
will be explored below, the British Psychological Society (BPS) identified 
malingering as one of the central areas to be considered when carrying out an 
assessment relating to fitness to plead (BPS, 2006), and countless others 
have observed that malingering is commonplace in forensic Psychology/ 
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Psychiatric assessments (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock & Condit, 2002; 
Eastman, Green, Latham & Lyall, 2013).  
 
The current study involved an investigation of how well a new measure of 
fitness to plead detects attempts at malingering, as well as exploring the 
literature and theory around malingering profiles and decision-making, with 
reference to the current data. In Part One of the Introduction, fitness to plead 
and its measurement are explored in detail, including discussion of decision-
making theory and assessment; in Part Two, the malingering literature is 
addressed, before focusing on malingering in relation to fitness to plead 
specifically. Finally, the new fitness to plead measure, the ‘FTP’, is introduced 
and the specific research questions for this study are described.  
 
Part One 
1.2. What is Fitness to Plead? 
Fitness to plead is a fundamental legal concept in England and Wales, and 
relates to the defendant’s ability to participate meaningfully in their trial; it is 
roughly analogous with the American concept of ‘competence to stand trial’. 
The concept of fitness to plead applies solely to defendants within the criminal 
justice system and every defendant is presumed fit to plead unless evidence 
is presented to the contrary. Whether or not a defendant is fit to plead is 
determined by the court judge, on the basis of expert evidence presented to 
the court by psychiatrists (Eastman, Adshead, Fox, Latham & Whyte, 2012). 
Expert clinicians are required to apply specific criteria in assessing whether a 
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defendant is fit to plead; in England and Wales, these criteria are the 
“Pritchard Criteria” and are founded in case law that dates back to 1836. The 
exact wording has changed relatively recently, with the judge from R v M 
(2003) restating the criteria as follows:  
“A finding of unfitness to plead involves demonstrating, on the balance of 
probabilities that the defendant is incapable of one or more of:  
(i) Understanding the charge or charges  
(ii) Deciding whether to plead guilty or not  
(iii) Exercising his right to challenge jurors  
(iv) Instructing solicitors and counsel  
(v) Following the course of proceedings, or  
(vi) Giving evidence in his own defence”        (Eastman et al., 2012, p 
475).  
 
The Pritchard test of fitness to plead has been described as a test primarily of 
cognitive ability, that takes into account the degree to which this cognitive 
ability is affected by “psychotic or other mental symptoms, neurological 
disorder or learning disability” (Eastman et al., 2012, p 474). Elsewhere, it has 
been stated that the reasons someone might be found unfit to plead include 
experiencing: difficulties resulting from mental illness, either longstanding or 
temporary, a developmental disorder, a Learning Disability/ cognitive 
impairment, communication impairment or some other relevant cause (Law 
Commission, 2016).  
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It is important to note here that what is being assessed is the impact a 
defendant’s mental condition has on their ability to comprehend trial 
proceedings: the mere existence of a psychological, neurological or 
neurodevelopmental disorder in and of itself is insufficient for a finding of 
unfitness (Exworthy, 2006). Memory difficulties for the alleged offence, for 
example, either organic or functional, might not necessarily lead to a finding of 
unfitness, with unfitness depending rather on the extent to which the 
difficulties impacted upon the defendant’s ability to understand and engage 
with the trial (Exworthy, 2006). Likewise, an individual might have a formal 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, a symptom of which is thought disorder, but that 
particular symptom might not be present to a degree that would preclude that 
individual comprehending the trial process to an adequate level under the 
Pritchard criteria (BPS, 2011). 
 
In terms of court processes, if a defendant is determined by a judge to be unfit 
to plead, they will not participate in a criminal trial; rather, a “trial of the facts” 
will proceed, which tasks a jury with determining whether the defendant “did 
the act or made the omission” of which they are accused (Compton, 2012). 
No conviction can result from such a trial, and if someone is found unfit to 
plead but also to have committed the act they were charged with, there are 
three outcomes or disposals available to the court: absolute discharge, a 
supervision order or a treatment order (the same disposals available if 
someone were found not guilty by reason of insanity) (Compton, 2012). 
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Finally, it is worth clarifying that unfitness to plead is distinct from insanity or 
diminished responsibility defences as unfitness is not a legal defence against 
the criminal charge, and pertains solely to whether a trial can proceed with the 
defendant’s current mental state; insanity and diminished responsibility relate 
to a defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged act (Bowden, 2001).  
 
1.3. Why is fitness to plead important? 
1.3.1. Fair trial 
The legal concept of fitness to plead is predicated on the assumption that 
everyone is entitled to a fair trial; everyone is entitled to have real and 
effective access to the court process and to have a real opportunity to present 
his or her case and challenge the case against them, with these rights being 
protected under article 6 of both the Human Rights Act (1998) and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Human Rights Act, 1998; 
European Convention on Human Rights). For a trial to proceed with an unfit 
defendant, it could be argued, would likely be unfair, as the defendant cannot 
be said to have a real opportunity to adequately present their defence case 
(Howard, 2011).  
 
1.3.2. Protecting vulnerable defendants 
A term frequently used in the literature and relevant here is that of a 
“vulnerable defendant”. A vulnerable defendant has been defined as a 
defendant that is either under the age of 18, or in the case of an adult, one 
who suffers from a mental disorder (as defined within Mental Health Act, 
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1983), or who has any other significant impairment of intelligence and/or 
social function (Ministry of Justice, 2013).  
 
As explored previously, the finding that a defendant is vulnerable as defined in 
these terms, is not sufficient to deem them unfit to plead, as it would depend 
on the impact that their disorder or impairment has on their ability to 
comprehend the trial process. However, a large proportion of defendants 
could apparently be accurately deemed to be vulnerable and have particular 
support needs which, if left unaddressed, could affect their ability to effectively 
participate in their trial, thereby compromising their right to a fair trial (Talbot, 
2012). Vulnerable defendants do not have statutory protection and it is at the 
discretion of the court as to whether these particular support needs2 are 
addressed (Talbot, 2012).  
    
This relates to fitness to plead as some authors, such as Gerry, and Talbot  
on behalf of the Prison Reform Trust, have argued that in order to ensure  
that as many defendants as possible receive a fair trial, the focus should be   
on supporting vulnerable defendants to participate with the trial process in     
the first instance, rather than finding them unfit to plead, thereby removing 
them from the process (Gerry, 2012; Talbot, 2012). The argument that a 
defendant should only be found unfit ‘in extremis’ appears to be put forth by 
Gerry, with the reasoning that being found unfit to plead denies the defendant 
the opportunity to put forward any defence or provide any reasons for their 
2 S pecific s upport needs  can be addres s ed by the us e of s pecial meas ures  or reas onable 
adjus tments  to the trial proces s , including us e of pre-recorded evidence, intermediaries , 
vis ual communication a ids  to name but a  few (T albot, 2012; G erry, 2012).  
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actions (as the ‘truth’ is determined by a trial of the facts in their absence), 
which amounts to inequitable treatment; rather, every effort should be made 
to adapt the way in which the trial is heard so as to accommodate the 
vulnerable defendant’s participation (Gerry, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, if someone lacks fitness to a degree that supports cannot 
or would likely not render them able to engage with the trial process, it could 
be argued that a finding of unfitness affords them the protection of removal 
from the trial process (Law Commission, 2016), which due to their inability to 
engage with the process and defend themselves, may otherwise have 
resulted in an unjust outcome e.g. a conviction on the basis of an unfair trial.  
 
One way forward might involve providing supports and special measures at 
the point of assessing fitness to plead, whereby every effort is made to ensure 
that the defendant can best represent their abilities to engage with the trial 
process at this pre-trial stage; if deemed fit, these supports could be provided 
at trial for the defendant who continues to require them, and if deemed unfit, 
the decision will have been taken in light of the defendant’s abilities as 
assessed under ‘fair’ and accommodating conditions (Howard, 2011).  
 
1.4. Findings of unfitness to plead 
The foregoing serves to highlight the importance of clinicians and judges 
‘getting it right’ when it comes to making decisions around a defendant’s 
fitness to plead. Attention will now be turned to situations in which a defendant 
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has been found unfit, considering the nature or profile of the unfitness and the 
frequency with which such judgements are made. 
 
1.4.1. Profiles of unfitness to plead 
There have been few studies which have assessed which profiles of 
impairment tend to be most associated with a finding of unfitness; Mackay 
and colleagues have suggested that, despite the legal criteria being primarily 
concerned with cognitive ability (i.e. ability to comprehend the trial 
proceedings), fewer than a third of those found unfit to plead actually have a 
learning disability (Mackay, Mitchell & Howe, 2007). Elsewhere, drawing on a 
sample of 479 court referrals for Psychiatric evaluation of fitness, it has been 
demonstrated that the finding of unfitness was most significantly associated 
with the presence of positive psychotic symptoms, in particular, the symptoms 
of conceptual disorganisation and delusional thinking (James, Duffield, Blizard 
& Hamiltion, 2001). In this same study, it was demonstrated that 73% of those 
found unfit to plead failed on 3 or more of the Pritchard criteria, indicating that 
the majority of those found unfit to plead are likely to have considerable 
impairment to their ability to engage with a trial (James et al., 2001).  
 
1.4.2. Frequency of unfitness to plead 
Of course, one of the difficulties in assessing the foregoing is in determining 
the extent to which the mental condition can impact the defendant’s ability to 
comprehend a trial before the defendant is deemed unfit (Exworthy, 2006). 
There has been considerable concern for some time that this threshold for 
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being found unfit is likely too high, and that vulnerable individuals are wrongly 
being found to be fit to plead, considering how few people are actually found 
to be unfit in England and Wales (Rogers, Blackwood, Farnham, Pickup & 
Watts, 2009;  Peay, 2009).  
 
Very little is known about the overall number of cases in which the issue of 
fitness to plead is raised in England and Wales, or the types of cases in which 
the issue of unfitness is raised before being rejected by the judge (Peay, 
2009). Between 1976 and 1988, an average of 25 defendants per year were 
found to be unfit to plead. Since a 1991 Act amending the disposal options 
available to the judge, findings of unfitness have gradually been increasing 
and between 1997 and 2001, an average of 66 people were found unfit to 
plead each year (Mackay et al., 2007). Current estimates are that 
approximately 100 defendants are found unfit per year (Compton, 2012). 
Although we do not know how these figures relate to the overall numbers of 
cases in which fitness to plead is raised, the numbers have been noted to be 
extremely low when taken in context of high rates of mental disorder in prison 
populations (Brewer, 2013); it has been stated, for example, that 1 in 7 
prisoners has either a psychotic illness or major depression, and that 1 in 2 
male prisoners has a personality disorder (Fazel & Danesh, 2002). 
Furthermore, in the USA, approximately 12,000 defendants are found to be 
incompetent to stand trial annually; the fact that the population of the USA is 
approximately 5 times greater than that of England & Wales notwithstanding, 
this remains a huge disparity and highlights the fact that to be found unfit to 
plead is comparatively extremely rare (Rogers et al., 2009; Brewer, 2013). 
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 Indeed, a qualitative study carried out amongst experienced barristers    
involved in cases where fitness to plead had been questioned revealed 
significant concerns. The majority of participants concurred that the threshold 
for unfitness under Pritchard criteria is too high, resulting in “mentally 
disordered defendants (who, although found fit to plead)…remained 
significantly prejudiced in relation to trial” (Rogers et al., 2009, p.822). The 
study also highlighted the need to distinguish between someone’s ability to 
enter a plea from their ability to adequately participate in their trial, with many 
supporting the idea of a ‘stage-specific’ assessment of fitness, rather than one 
global judgement (Rogers et al., 2009). Elsewhere, Forensic Psychiatrists 
have referred to the Pritchard criteria as being no longer appropriate in light of 
modern understanding of complex mental disorders, and described them as 
“shamefully archaic” (Shah, 2012, p.176) and unfit for the 21st century (Morris, 
Elcock, Hardy & Mackay, 2006).  
 
1.4.3  Application of the Pritchard criteria 
In addition to the threshold for unfitness under the Pritchard criteria being 
deemed too high or the criteria themselves inappropriate, clinicians have 
apparently been found to apply these criteria inconsistently; for example, 
Grubin carried out an analysis of all cases of unfitness to plead between 1976 
and 1988 and reported that as well as disagreement between psychiatrists as 
to fitness status in over 15% of the cases, criteria seemed to have been 
applied “idiosyncratically and arbitrarily” (Grubin, 1991, p. 7). Mackay and 
Kearns (2000) examined 197 psychiatric reports and found that only 21 
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considered all of the Pritchard criteria, while 28 ignored all of the Pritchard 
criteria, referring only to diagnostic criteria. More recently, Mackay and 
colleagues considered pre-trial reports and found that out of 641 such reports, 
only 11 reports considered all of the Pritchard criteria in their assessment and 
that in 89 of the reports, a decision around fitness was made without 
considering any of the Pritchard criteria (Mackay, Mitchell & Howe, 2007, as 
cited in Brewer, 2013).  
 
1.5  Recent thinking about the concept and measurement of fitness to 
plead 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent thinking has indicated that the measurement of 
fitness to plead likely requires an overhaul, so as to better protect vulnerable 
defendants who are ‘slipping through the net’ and unjustly expected to face 
trial, with a large-scale Law Commission consultation process revealing 
almost unilateral agreement that the current fitness to plead criteria are 
inadequate (Law Commission, 2013).  
 
The Law Commission’s consultation (2010) with a wide-ranging group of 
experts has looked at re-formulating fitness to plead and has focussed on the 
utility of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) (2005) in this regard. Within civil law, 
the MCA is used to determine an individual’s ability to make decisions, 
namely their ability to understand, retain, use and weigh, and communicate 
information relating to their decision (Law Commission, 2010). Experts have 
argued that fitness to plead could reasonably be assessed in a similar way; 
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the Pritchard criteria place a ‘disproportionate emphasis’ on intellectual 
capacity, and neglect the decision-making abilities essential to the defendant 
being able to effectively participate in their trial. A fitness to plead test based 
on decision-making capacity should be broad enough to cover reasoning 
difficulties which are caused by reasons other than cognitive impairment (such 
as psychological or emotional difficulties) (Law Commission, 2010). Crucially, 
the new test, in line with the functional approach of the MCA, would address 
the person’s time- and context-specific decision-making abilities, as opposed 
to the abstract, static requirements of the Pritchard criteria. It is important to 
note that in an assessment of decision-making capacity, the quality of the 
decision being made is quite independent of the ability of the individual to 
make it (Jonassen, 2012) and, therefore, should the defendant show decision-
making capacity by evidence of applying all elements of the decision-making 
process while completing their fitness to plead assessment, it would seem 
that the clinician cannot and should not conclude that someone is unfit merely 
by arriving at a non-optimal decision.  
 
Formulating fitness to plead in line with the Mental Capacity Act (2005) would 
ensure that the task of appearing in court and all that that entails is 
operationalised “in terms of its specific demands and that the cognitive and/or 
psychological capacities required to fulfil those demands are clearly outlined” 
(Rogers, Blackwood, Farnham, Pickup & Watts, 2008, p. 584).    
  
The Law Commission’s proposed re-formulation has not been met with 
unanimous approval within the field, however.  Some have commented that 
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this new approach, of moving away from the defendant's intellectual ability to 
understand court proceedings in the abstract, towards their functional ability to 
make the decisions required to participate in their trial, is unwarranted and will 
require additional court time and resources, with little apparent benefit 
(Mudathikundan, Chao & Forrester, 2014). The authors argue that in fact the 
problems with fitness to plead under Pritchard criteria relate primarily to the 
lack of consistent application by clinicians, rather than to an inherent 
conceptual failing (Mudathikundan et al., 2014). 
 
Some have indicated that the criteria are flexible enough to identify 
defendants who were unfit to plead for a variety of reasons (including 
psychosis and learning disabilities) (MacKay, Mitchell, & Howe, 2007), and 
that a more fruitful route may be better training for clinicians in the application 
of the criteria as they currently exist (Mudathikundan et al., 2014).  
 
Indeed, the Law Commission describe several points of disagreement 
amongst the respondents to its proposal paper (a group comprising members 
of the judiciary, psychiatrists and psychologists); for example, the issue of 
whether the primary competence that a new fitness to plead test would 
measure would be decision-making capacity or the ability to participate 
effectively in proceedings was disputed, and remains unresolved (Law 
Commission, 2013). Additionally, the question was raised as to whether a 
fitness to plead test should assess a unitary construct of fitness, i.e. whether a 
defendant has the decision-making capacity in relation to all aspects of a trial, 
or a disaggregated construct, whereby the trial would be broken down into 
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sections which would each require a decision-making capacity judgement 
(Law Commission, 2010). The latter approach apparently has considerable 
support amongst legal and medical professionals, but would however, create 
a problematic precedent whereby a defendant could be found fit to enter a 
guilty plea yet simultaneously be unfit to effectively participate in other 
aspects of their trial (Law Commission, 2010).  
 
It is also important to mention that while the above discussion reflects the live 
debates surrounding the Law Commission’s push for re-formulating fitness to 
plead, and is often primarily concerned with the associated legal implications 
of such a change, elsewhere, psychologists have concerned themselves with 
delineating the specific psychological and behavioural processes involved and 
how these can be measured using existing psychometric measures. For 
example, the BPS have drawn up guidelines for specific areas (in addition to 
the Pritchard criteria) that may be considered by a clinician in making fitness 
to plead assessments, as follows: comprehension; reasoning ability; 
consistency; memory; concentration and attention; suggestibility; 
inappropriateness; impulsivity; insight; affect; passivity; and the dangers of 
‘faking bad’ or malingering (BPS, 2006).  Similarly, a recent study analysing 
the reports of those found unfit to stand trial under Australian law (employing 
“Presser” criteria, very similar to Pritchard criteria), found that attention and 
memory play a particularly important role in influencing fitness to stand trial, 
yet they were assessed in only 60% of cases; likewise, approximately 60% of 
clinicians used no objective measure of effort or malingering, despite 
guidelines to the contrary (White, Batchelor, Pulman & Howard, 2012). It is 
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worth considering the possibility that the elements and tools necessary for a 
comprehensive and valid test of fitness to plead have already been described, 
and the problem concerns the lack of widespread adherence to this evidence-
based model.  
 
1.6 Decision-making capacity 
  
Considering the centrality of decision-making capacity to the newly proposed 
fitness to plead test, it is worthwhile attending to this complex construct and 
disentangling its various components. Generally speaking, theories 
concerning decision-making and choice fall into one of two categories: 
normative or descriptive. Normative theories relate to how we as humans 
“should” reason or make decisions (i.e. using a purely rational model) and 
descriptive theories aim to describe how people actually think when they are 
making decisions (i.e. acknowledging that humans operate with limited 
rationality due to cognitive limitations) (Hanson, 2005; Dillon, 1998). Theories 
falling into the latter category have unsurprisingly received more attention in 
the Psychology literature, attempting as they do to explain the real-world 
patterns of and constraints on human decision-making, with much reference 
to heuristics and cognitive biases (Beresford & Sloper, 2008; Oliveira, 2007).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to explore in detail the multitude of 
decision-making theories that exist; rather, some attention will be given to the 
literature around factors that influence an individual’s functional ability to make 
decisions as will be implicated in an assessment of a defendant’s fitness to 
plead.   
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 1.6.1. Factors influencing decision-making capacity 
  
Firstly, unsurprisingly, considerable evidence exists to demonstrate that poor 
cognitive ability tends to impact upon decision-making capacity, specifically as 
it often prevents individuals from being able to retain and weigh all of the 
consequences of different options before deciding (Smith & Bell, 2006).   
 
Elsewhere, a recent study has argued that there are certain temporal abilities 
which are central to one’s decision-making capacity, and that it is these 
same abilities which are compromised amongst severely depressed patients 
(Owen, Freyenhagen, Hotopf & Martin, 2015). These same authors note that 
in the case of legal probing of decision-making capacity, assessors will likely 
need to devise avenues of questioning which can elicit the temporal abilities 
of the patient, specifically their ability to project themselves onto ‘yet-to-be-
realised’ futures significantly different from their current reality (Owen et al., 
2015).  
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Researchers have identified that the impulsivity characteristic of Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) is a critical impairment in the decision-making 
process, and that specifically, BPD patients tended not to integrate feedback 
information to improve their decisions (Schuermann, Kathmann, Stiglmayr, 
Renneberg & Endrass, 2011). In line with the James et al. (2001) study 
mentioned previously, indicating that psychosis was the mental disorder 
most likely to accompany a finding of unfitness to plead, it has been 
demonstrated that psychotic symptoms were the strongest predictor of 
impaired decision-making capacity amongst a Psychiatric sample (Candia & 
Barba, 2011).  
 
Some research has focused on age as a factor that may influence one’s 
decision-making capacity, specifically in relation to younger adults and fitness 
to plead, indicating that the degree of maturity of cognitive abilities, as well as 
social-emotional capacities, are relevant factors in this population (Rogers et 
al., 2008; Cowden & McKee, 1995). Amongst younger people, the ability to 
use information accurately as a basis for their decisions, might, as a result of 
cognitive immaturity, be of greater concern than their factual understanding 
(Baird & Fugelsang, 2004). 
 
It is important to acknowledge that there are also potential situational factors 
to consider in terms of how they might influence decision-making, particularly 
in the case of unfamiliar or stressful situations. It has been found that when 
faced with a decision for which one does not have a precedent (such as 
whether or not to plead guilty, or any number of decisions involved in standing 
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trial), it is unsurprisingly more difficult to apply rationality and method to one’s 
decision-making, and thus creativity and intuition may play a more prominent 
role in these decisions (Al-Tarawneh, 2012; Khatri & Ng, 2000).  
 
In the case of the effect of stress on decision-making, a comprehensive 
review has outlined the various routes by which stress can have an impact; 
firstly, on a neural level, the regions of the brain that are associated with 
optimal decision-making are vulnerable to stress-induced changes (Starcke & 
Brand, 2012). It seems that, under stressful conditions, an individual is more 
likely to employ a dysfunctional or non-optimal decision-making strategy, and 
show both heightened reward sensitivity and lowered punishment sensitivity 
(Baradell & Klein, 1993; Gray, 1999). It is thought that the cognitive resources 
required for making decisions, such as working memory and set-shifting, are 
compromised by the presence of stress, and furthermore, that the impact of 
stress may be compounded for those who experience any of a wide range of 
disorders in which stress plays a role, such as Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  
 
Finally, it is important to mention here the role of malingering in influencing 
someone’s portrayal of their decision-making capacity. It has been said that 
malingering an impairment can be viewed as a “manifestation of wilful choice 
for personal advantage” (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003, p 13), and that 
anyone is capable of choosing to malinger upon conducting a ‘cost-benefit’ 
analysis of their options within an assessment they perceive as inimical to 
their needs (Rogers, 1997).   
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A comprehensive assessment of fitness to plead will require that the clinician 
be alert to the multitude of factors, either fixed or situational, which may be 
influencing the defendant’s decision-making capacity at that time.  
 
 
1.7.Standardised assessments of Fitness to Plead (UK) and Competence 
to Stand Trial (USA) 
 
One of the key recommendations from the Law Commission Consultation has 
been that a standardised psychiatric instrument be developed that measures 
this newly defined concept of fitness to plead (emphasising decision-making 
capacity and/ or effective participation in one’s trial); this recommendation, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, has been met with extremely varying degrees of 
approval, and it is to this issue of standardised testing of fitness to plead 
which we will now turn.    
 
A systematic review has identified 19 relevant assessment tools, 18 of which 
have been developed to measure “Competence to Stand Trial” amongst 
American defendants. In the United States, screening/ assessment tools for 
Competence to Stand trial have been reported to be used relatively routinely 
and successfully (Rogers et al., 2008). 
 
It is important to note here that no one measure of competence to stand trial 
or fitness to plead can be used in isolation to determine whether an individual 
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is competent or incompetent; all assessment tools are used in the context of a 
wider clinical assessment. Furthermore, the nature of these assessment 
measures varies considerably from one to the next. For example, some could 
be considered structured professional judgement tools and are, in essence, a 
checklist to guide the clinician in ensuring that all competence-related abilities 
are considered, compared with other measures which are much more 
psychometric in nature, and have been standardised and normed on various 
populations (Otto, 2006).  
 
The most widely used of these measures include the Fitness Interview Test 
(FIT) (Roesch, Zapf, Eaves & Webster, 1998), the Evaluation of Competency 
to Stand Trial- Revised (ECST-R) (Rogers, Tillbrook & Sewell, 2004) and the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool- Criminal Adjudication MacCAT-CA 
(Hoge, Bonnie, Poythress & Monahan, 1999), the FIT falling into the category 
of Structured Professional Judgement tool and the other two being 
standardised measures (Otto, 2006). These measures vary with reference to 
their theoretical underpinnings and the focus of their items; for example, the 
FIT is a semi-structured interview, consisting of 16 items which cover the 
defendant’s ability to understand the nature and object of criminal 
proceedings, the consequences of such proceedings, and their ability to 
communicate with counsel, with items being generic and unrelated to a 
specific case (Zapf & Roesch, 2005). The ECST-R is similarly a semi-
structured interview, covering “Factual Understanding of the Courtroom 
Proceedings”, “Rational Understanding of the Courtroom” and “Consult with 
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Counsel” abilities3; crucially, the ECST-R addresses a noted weakness in 
previous measures by building in a “feigning/ malingering incompetence” 
scale (Vitaco, Rogers & Gabel, 2009). Both have been shown to have good 
inter-rater reliability and good predictive validity (in distinguishing between 
incompetent and competent respondents, with court rulings as the external 
criterion) (Zapf & Roesch, 2005; Vitaco et al., 2009).  
 
Given the marked differences in the American and UK legal systems, 
however, the most relevant measure for the current study is the MacCAT-CA 
which is the only measure which has been amended to specifically reflect the 
UK criminal justice system. Referred to as the “queen of competency 
instruments” (Acklin, 2012), the MacCAT-CA is informed by findings of a 
comprehensive field study, and consists of 22 items based on a vignette of a 
hypothetical fight between two men; the items relate to the same three factors 
as the ECST-R, namely factual understanding, rational understanding and the 
ability to consult with counsel (Rogers et al., 2008).  Its amendment for use 
with British defendants involved the removal of reference to jury sentencing 
(not applicable in the UK) and the renaming of offences; this new version, the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool- Fitness to Plead (MacCAT-FP) 
has been found to have good internal consistency and inter-rater reliability, 
with a correlation of scores with clinicians judgements of 0.77 (Akinkunmi, 
2002). However, this inaugural UK-specific Fitness to Plead measure appears 
3 T hes e abilities  relate to the “D us ky” S tandard in U.S . S upreme C ourt C ompetency to S tand 
T rial; the defendant mus t pos s es s  factual unders tanding of court proceedings , as  well as  a  
“rational” unders tanding, which in this  context, means  “non-delus ional and non-ps ychotic” 
unders tanding of the proceedings  (F elthous , 2011).   
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to have received negligible attention in the literature and has not entered into 
routine use amongst clinicians (Brewer, 2013; Rogers et a.l, 2008); some 
reasons offered to explain this lack of popularity include the fact that it still 
relies on some subjectivity and deals primarily with one type of fitness issue 
(learning disability) (Rogers, 2013), the limited clinical utility when the vignette 
is too far removed from the actual case (Rogers et al., 2008) as well as its 
omission of a malingering scale (Mankad, Brakel & Wilson, 2002).  
 
Additionally, some have criticised this approach, of attempting to import an 
American measure with all of its established psychometric properties, with 
minimal conceptual amendment to address the specifics of fitness to plead 
and with no standardisation to a UK population (Mullen, 2002). 
 
Relevant here is the fact that while many in the literature have called for a 
long overdue standardised instrument for the UK, there is a noted reluctance 
on the part of clinicians themselves to rely on such an instrument in helping 
them to make fitness to plead judgements. A recent paper from the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists highlights this reluctance among many to rely on a 
standardised test in making fitness to plead judgements; although the 
consensus of the feedback was that clinicians agreed that the Pritchard 
criteria need to be overhauled, it seems that many do not want a specific 
measure to be imposed. To quote, “we would argue that (the absence of a 
measure for fitness to plead) rather than leaving psychiatrists unequipped, 
allows them the freedom to tailor their professionalism to each individual 
unique case….introducing any defined psychiatric test…would appear to run 
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the risk of creating a burden of rigid and perhaps unnecessary testing”, and 
may also give a false sense of scientific validity (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2011, p. 17). They also raised concerns about there not being a 
baseline against which to calibrate the test, and difficulties in determining the 
accuracy of any such test. An influential writer in this area, Grubin has also 
made the point that evaluations under the Mental Capacity Act proceed 
without recourse to such a test, and that fitness to plead is unlikely to lend 
itself well to a standardised test (Grubin, 2011).   
 
Fighting the corner for the widespread introduction of a standardised 
assessment measure are those who argue that the biggest problem in 
modernising fitness to plead assessments is the lack of consistency between 
clinicians and that the addition of a suitable standardised measure of fitness 
to plead would reduce the unacceptable level of subjectivity in such 
judgements (Akinkunmi, 2002) as well as reducing the level of disagreement 
that currently exists amongst clinicians regarding fitness to plead 
assessments (Brewer, 2013). 
 
Elsewhere, some have suggested that while psychologists may be 
comfortable with standardised measures, the use of such testing (by 
psychiatrists) in the clinical setting could be akin to the abandonment of the 
clinical foundations on which the profession of forensic psychiatry is based, 
and expressed doubt that such tools would ever enhance let alone replace the 
clinical interview in making these judgements (Mankad, Brakel & Wilson, 
2002).  
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 1.7.1 A note on the role of psychologists in assessing Fitness to Plead 
 
Many of the responses to the original Law Commission paper highlighted the 
fact that psychologists (typically clinical or forensic) currently carry out many 
of the assessments related to fitness to plead judgements, with specialist 
training in administering psychometric measures relevant to fitness to plead, 
as well as the fact that psychologists already qualify as a “Responsible 
Clinician” under the Mental Health Act 2007 (Law Commission, 2013).  The 
BPS have published guidelines for psychologists in carrying out capacity 
assessments as well as how to address the Pritchard test within a framework 
of ‘best practice’, adding such dimensions as concentration/attention span 
and suggestibility (BPS, 2006). Some have noted that, as it stands, 
psychologists are often responsible for carrying out cognitive assessments 
and report-writing and psychiatrists have sometimes merely been “rubber-
stamping” the psychologist’s assessment (Law Commission, 2013).  To this 
end, many have suggested that it is time-wasting and economically ill-advised 
to require two medical practitioners, rather than have a psychologist fulfil the 
role of one of the two required experts (Law Commission, 2013); furthermore, 
psychologists’ training provide them with more expertise (than psychiatrists) in 
considering how best to support defendants to participate effectively in the 
trial process (Law Commission, 2016).  
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1.7.2 New measure of Fitness to Plead: the ‘FTP’ 
 
The foregoing debate around standardised testing notwithstanding, 
researchers in Kings College London have now attempted to answer this call 
from the Law Commission and develop an updated measure of fitness to 
plead that will tap into the decision-making capacity of an individual, using 
context-specific items (Blackwood, Brown, Brewer, Appiah-Kusi, Peay & 
Watts, in preparation). The measure, called the FTP, involves a video 
vignette, and questions the defendant about the roles of different court 
personnel, as well as reasoning behind different pleas and courses of action; 
in common with many of the established measures for use in North America, 
the FTP also includes items designed to measure malingering.  
 
It is important to note that this measure is intended to be used within a clinical 
assessment of fitness to plead and that the researchers do not intend that 
decisions around fitness to plead be based solely upon the defendant’s 
performance on this tool. To this end, the measure will not employ ‘cut-off’ 
scores for fitness or unfitness; an individual’s score can be compared against 
established base rates within the defendant’s I.Q. range, but the clinician’s 
judgement around fitness or not will not be determined by the specific score 
alone, i.e. it is not intended that the measure will replace clinical judgement, 
as feared by some psychiatrists, but rather that it will complement and inform 
it.   
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Following on from the distinction between a standardised, psychometric 
measure, and a structured professional judgement tool, it is envisaged that 
the FTP will fall in line with structured professional judgement, as a tool 
designed to cover the primary competencies of fitness to plead and 
highlighting areas which may need further investigation by the clinician; as 
above, there is no intention that the FTP will be a psychometric tool from 
which cut-off scores might be applied in order to indicate fitness or otherwise. 
The FTP is currently being trialled in various settings as a means of 
establishing its sensitivity as an assessment tool across different groups.  
The malingering items contained within the FTP will similarly be used as a 
means of highlighting potential malingering for the clinician, which can then be 
followed up on where required.  
 
Part Two 
 
1.8. Malingering in the psycholegal context 
 
Malingering has been defined as “the intentional production of false or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external 
incentives” (APA, 2000). It should apparently always be considered a 
possibility whenever the outcome of the evaluation may be “related to an 
opportunity for financial or legal gain for the patient” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994, as cited in Borckardt, Engum, Lambert, Nash, Bracy & 
Ray, 2003). One study has indicated that over 18% of patients who were 
found incompetent to stand trial had been malingering their psychiatric 
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symptoms on admission to an inpatient facility for restoration (McDermott, 
Dualan & Scott, 2013). Elsewhere, 54% of cases in criminal/ forensic field 
were reported as probable/definite malingerers, although clearly, considering 
the covert nature of malingering, base rates are difficult to estimate with 
confidence (Ardolf, Denny & Houston, 2007;  BPS, 2009).  
 
McDermott and her colleagues have indicated that malingering in the context 
of the criminal justice system is generally for one of two purposes: either to 
present as incompetent to stand trial or to plead not guilty by reason of 
insanity; in both cases, malingering a psychotic disorder has been deemed 
the most likely method of successfully evading trial, and to a lesser extent, 
feigning intellectual deficits (McDermott et al., 2013).  
 
1.8.1 Malingering and fitness to plead 
 
Of course, as has been explored above, U.K. findings of fitness to plead 
under the current Pritchard criteria are, unlike findings of incompetence to 
stand trial, extremely rare. As the threshold for unfitness is so high, it has 
been noted that fitness to plead usually only becomes an issue in cases of 
quite severe psychiatric disorder and/or learning disability (Bowden, 2001). 
This is not to say that defendants do not attempt to maligner unfitness, 
although data are sparse; Eastman and colleagues have noted that 
attempting to be found unfit to plead is a common motivation for malingering a 
mental disorder (Eastman et al., 2012).  Several theories have been put 
forward to provide an explanation for the potential motivations for malingering, 
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with Rogers’ adaptational model being the most widely-accepted. Quite 
simply, according to this model, the malingerer is faced with an adverse 
situation (such as an arrest). The model suggests that under these 
circumstances, the individual weighs up their options and determines that 
malingering mental illness/deficit is the only viable means of avoiding 
trial/conviction (Rogers, 2008 as cited in McDermott et al., 2013).   
Relevant here is the ‘cost-benefit’ analysis mentioned previously in the 
context of decision-making, in that anyone could apparently be capable of 
malingering if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs; indeed that 
malingering is itself a form of rational behaviour governed primarily by cost-
benefit analyses (Merckelbach & Collaris, 2012) . An individual is unlikely to 
malinger, for example, as a means to evade an offence punishable only by a 
relatively minor fine, as the benefits do not outweigh the potential costs of 
being ‘found out’ (Rogers & Neumann, 2003). Of course, there are also 
numerous personal factors implicated in a decision to malinger, such as the 
value one places on honesty, which introduces the issue of morality; it has 
been suggested that malingerers be viewed simply as lacking the ‘moral 
faculties’ that most of us take for granted (Halligan et al., 2003). However, this 
view of the malingerer as ‘amoral’ is likely to be an oversimplified one, as 
many studies have highlighted an array of situations in which departures from 
one’s values around honesty and truth-telling appear to be normative; for 
example, one Australian study indicating that approximately 80% of 
undergraduates surveyed  admitted to having engaged in some form of 
cheating (Halligan et al., 2003) and, closer to home, some 70% of the British 
Social Attitudes survey sample considered VAT evasion for a home repair bill 
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to be wrong, while 71% of the same sample were nonetheless prepared to 
engage in similar tax evasion in a comparable situation (Park, Curtice, 
Thompson, Jarvis & Bromley, 2001, as cited in Halligan et al., 2003). It is 
clear that the interplay between one’s values and the degree to which this 
influences one’s decision to act honestly or otherwise is complex and likely to 
depend on the specific cost-benefit ratio of a specific decision.   
 
In the case of fitness to plead, one could infer that an individual may be 
motivated to incur the cost of malingering due to the considerable benefits 
perceived in receiving a subjectively more lenient sentence by means of one 
of the court disposals. It is important to mention however that prior to making 
one of the orders, the court can remand the defendant to hospital for 
treatment, with a view to the defendant becoming fit and a second fitness to 
plead hearing being arranged (Crown Prosecution Service, 2016).   
 
There is limited information regarding the demographics or risk factors for 
malingering, with one study indicating that suspected malingerers may be 
described, on average, as having lower levels of education and cognitive 
functioning in the low average range (Haines & Norris, 2001).  
 
If a newly defined measure of fitness to plead, focusing on decision-making 
capacity, is indeed implemented, the desired outcome is, naturally, that more 
vulnerable individuals will be protected from facing trial inappropriately; 
however, in order to preserve the integrity of fitness to plead judgements, one 
must allow that a lower threshold for unfitness may inevitably be accompanied 
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by increased rates of malingering of unfitness in an attempt to avoid a criminal 
conviction and/or a prison sentence.  
 
 
1.8.2 Different profiles of malingering 
 
Much debate exists in the literature around the specific nature of the construct 
of malingering. One study, involving the assessment of a group of 57 men 
suspected of malingering incompetence to stand trial claimed to have 
identified six different types of malingering: (i) indiscriminant endorsement of 
symptoms (global malingering), (ii) malingered psychotic mental illness; (iii) 
fabrication of neurocognitive deficits; (iv) affective and cognitive symptom 
fabrications; (v) measure dependent malingering (e.g. inconsistent pattern of 
malingering across different measures); and (vi) no readily identifiable 
approach to the tests, i.e. malingering not-otherwise-specified (Heinze & 
Purisch, 2001). 
 
Elsewhere, Rogers has systematically identified three domains of malingering 
in the medicolegal context: malingering of mental disorders, malingering of 
cognitive impairment and malingering of medical symptoms (Walters, Berry, 
Rogers, Payne & Granacher Jr, 2009).   
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1.8.3 Assessing malingering 
 
The foregoing underlines the importance of the clinician assessing for 
malingering; indeed, year on year, huge numbers of malingering assessment 
instruments are being created (Rosenfeld, Green, Pivovarova, Dole & Zapf, 
2010), using increasingly diverse and sophisticated methods (Greve & 
Mianchini, 2003).  
 
This booming business is legitimised by evidence that in the absence of 
malingering instruments, clinicians can be ‘oblivious’ to malingering (Meyers & 
Volbrecht, 2003). BPS guidelines around assessing effort are explicit in this 
regard, stipulating that tests of effort should be given routinely as part of 
clinical assessment relating to cognitive function, and that failure of any effort 
test should always compel the clinician to consider deceit (malingering) (BPS, 
2009).  
 
Within the assessment of malingering, there are several recognised detection 
strategies: (i) ‘Floor Effect’ testing, whereby failing very easy items is an 
indication of likely malingering; (ii) ‘Symptom Validity’ testing, which involves 
repeated forced-choice trials presenting two stimuli that the respondent must 
choose between, with the assumption that if someone scores below chance, 
their performance has been malingered; (iii) ‘Performance curve’ testing, 
whereby someone failing easy items, but passing more difficult ones, is 
potentially indicative of malingering; (iv) ‘Magnitude of Error’, which involves 
examining features of the wrong answer for evidence of exaggeration or 
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fabrication; (v) ‘Atypical Presentations’, in which the individual performs at 
different levels across similar tests or across re-testing and (vi) ‘Psychological 
sequelae’ which relates to malingerers faking symptoms which are 
inconsistent with their alleged problem (Eastman, Green, Latham & Lyall, 
2013; Conroy & Kwartner, 2006).  
 
Much of the malingering literature concerns common psychometric tests that 
have been “doing double duty” as tests of malingering; these tests can be 
divided into those which have commonly been used to assess malingered 
psychopathology such as the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms 
(SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992)  and the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory 2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & 
Kaemmer, 1989), versus malingered cognitive deficits, such as the WAIS and 
the Rey complex figure test (Meyers & Volbrecht, 2003).  
 
Both the SIRS and the MMPI-2 rely on the response bias, i.e., the finding that 
individuals who fabricate symptoms tend to report more symptoms than those 
who suffer from true mental illnesses, with inbuilt scales to detect deliberate 
distortions of psychological functioning (Heinze & Purisch, 2001).  
 
The SIRS has been extensively validated and found to be highly effective at 
differentiating malingerers from those with genuine mental health conditions, 
and it thus considered by many to be a gold standard measure in the 
assessment of malingering (Vitaco et al., 2007; Green & Rosenfeld, 2011). 
Outside of research however, its utility is limited by its lengthy nature (Edens, 
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Poythress & Watkins-Clay, 2005). Elsewhere, the MMPI-2 has also been 
shown to have high rates of predictive validity, with one study demonstrating 
its high degree of accuracy in distinguishing between inmates incentivised to 
simulate mental illness between those who answered normally (Iverson, 
Franzen & Hammond, 1995). 
 
Few studies have directly compared malingering instruments of this type, but 
one study comparing the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 
1991), the SIRS and the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology 
(SIMS; Smith & Burger, 1997) found that all three had comparable predictive 
accuracy amongst prison participants4, but that only the PAI scales were 
capable of distinguishing psychiatric patients from simulated malingerers 
(Edens, Poythress & Watkins-Clay, 2005). 
 
Another study has also indicated that the PAI and MMPI-2 malingering scales 
alone perform well as screening measures for malingering within a criminal 
defendant sample (i.e. these scales were predictive of the classification or 
otherwise of malingering, based on the full SIRS score) (Boccaccini, Murrie & 
Duncan, 2006). Suffice to say, there are many options available to the 
clinician wishing to investigate malingering of psychopathology.  
 
With regards to being alerted to malingered cognitive difficulties, a meta-
analysis of 24 studies using scores on the WAIS digit-span has revealed that 
4 T he meas ures  were adminis tered to four different groups : s us pected malingerers , thos e 
ins tructed to malinger, a  ps ychiatric group and a control group.  
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the digit-span scale has strong specificity in discriminating between 
malingerers and genuine responders, relying on the sub-optimal efforts of 
those malingering cognitive deficits. The WAIS is a very commonly used 
cognitive battery in neurocognitive assessments anyway, and thus the use of 
already collected information in highlighting potential malingering is efficient 
for clinicians (Jasinski, Berry, Shandera & Clark, 2011).  
 
In addition to these batteries with inbuilt malingering scales, there have been 
many developed stand-alone tests of malingering, such as the Test of 
Malingered Memory (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) which tests exclusively for 
sub-optimal effort by presenting the respondent with unchallenging forced-
choice tasks and then screening for whether the results fall below that 
expected by chance (i.e. a symptom validity detection strategy) (Love, 
Glassmire, Zanolini & Wolf, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, certain tests not originally developed to test malingering, 
such as the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM; Raven, 1989), 
which was originally developed as a measure of I.Q., have since been re-
purposed as stand-alone tests.  The RSPM presents sets of matrices which 
become increasingly difficult as testing progresses; the reasoning behind the 
appropriation of these scales as a stand-alone malingering test is that 
malingers would not necessarily anticipate this increasing difficulty and 
therefore would fail to demonstrate the typical performance curve of genuine 
respondents (Sellers, Byrne & Gollus, 2006; Conroy & Kwartner, 2006); it has 
been argued that this approach is less vulnerable to coaching and less 
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transparent to respondents than forced-choice measures (Bender & Rogers, 
2004).   
 
1.8.4 Assessing Malingering in Fitness to Plead/ Competence to Stand 
trial decisions 
 
The above has explored the measurement of malingering and described 
some assessments which can assist the clinician in making judgements about 
whether a client/ defendant’s symptoms relevant to their fitness/ competence 
are likely to be malingered.  
 
Considering the discussion of standardised testing of fitness to plead, it is 
worth giving some attention to the specific inclusion of malingering items in 
fitness to plead measures. To quote: “An obvious shortcoming of current 
forensic instruments assessing competence to stand trial abilities is their 
general inattention to forms of dissimulation and symptom 
fabrication...Measures reveal a high level of face validity and an implicit 
assumption that criminal defendants will respond to the assessment 
instruments honestly” (Heinze et al., 2001, p. 24). The failure of most 
competence measures to address malingering decreases their usefulness by 
necessitating additional testing for malingering (Grisso, 2003; Abrams, 2002, 
as cited in Rogers, Jackson, Sewell & Harrison, 2004).  
 
The seminal study in this area, which sought to address this vulnerability of 
competence measures, involved asking offenders to deliberately malinger 
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incompetence on the Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT, 1980); it was 
found that this group successfully “cheated the test” i.e. were rated as 
incompetent, prompting the development of the Atypical Presentation Scale 
within the GCCT to screen for such attempts (Gothard, Richards & Sewell, 
1995).  
  
More recently, the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial-Revised (ECST-
R) has built in Atypical Presentation Scales into its items, and has been found 
to have good predictive validity in distinguishing between simulated 
malingerers, controls and genuine incompetent defendants (Rogers et al., 
2004). However, these two measures notwithstanding, the majority of the 
most frequently used competence measures fail to systematically screen for 
malingering.   
 
1.9. The present study 
 
The current study has investigated whether or not the malingering items in the 
newly-developed FTP test are useful in detecting respondents who are 
simulating malingering.  
 
.  The items of the FTP that have been designed to alert the clinician to the 
potential for malingering draw on the literature of stand-alone testing for 
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malingered deficits, utilising the floor effect5. Respondents who fail to answer 
all of these easy items correctly will be classified as “potential malingerers”.  
 
The researcher was blind to which respondents received instructions to 
simulate malingering versus those who were instructed to perform to the best 
of their ability. Participants were also instructed to complete the Ravens 
Standard Progressive Matrices, used as a criterion measure so as to aid 
interpretation of the simulation group’s efforts at malingering. All participants 
were also asked whether or not they thought there were any items that were 
included to ‘catch them out’, so as to inform thinking around the transparency 
of the current items, as well as items concerning their knowledge of fitness to 
plead and malingering profiles.  
 
The scores on the FTP of those within the simulating malingering group were 
compared with those of the control group, so as to determine whether the 
malingerers have been successful in underperforming on the measure, 
without ‘falling’ for the malingering items.  Also compared was the frequency 
with which different malingering items were failed so as to rate the relative 
effectiveness of items. It is envisaged that the results of this investigation will 
contribute to the further development of this new measure, so as to enhance 
its usefulness for clinicians, as well as providing information more generally 
about the nature of lay attempts at simulated malingering.  
  
5 T he “floor effect” detection s trategy is  bas ed on the as s umption that even s everely impaired 
individuals  are capable of ans wering certain s imple items  and thus  failure on thes e items  is  an 
effective indicator of malingering (C onroy & K wartner, 2006).  
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 1.9.1 Research Questions  
 
1. What are the sensitivity, specificity, and negative/ positive predictive 
values of the FTP with regards to malingering? 
2. Which of the specific FTP malingering items are the most/least 
successful at identifying malingerers? 
3. What do participants understand fitness to plead to mean? 
4. What ‘profiles’ of malingering do respondents instructed to malinger 
enact? 
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                                   Chapter 2:  Method 
 
2.1. Ethical approval  
This study received ethical approval by the Royal Holloway, University of 
London Research Ethics Committee on 22nd of June, 2015 (Appendix 1). 
 
The Ethics Committee had initial concerns that as the Fitness to Plead (FTP) 
tool (described below) relates to a fictional trial about an Actual Bodily Harm 
(ABH) offence, participants may find the film distressing or traumatic. It is 
important to note that the film depicts discussions between legal counsel and 
the defendant, as well as some courtroom questioning about the crime, but at 
no point are there any depictions of violence or images of violence. However, 
these concerns were noted and the debriefing information highlighted suitable 
available support for participants, should they have been in any way affected 
by their participation in the research (Appendix 2).  
 
2.2. Design  
This study employed a mixed-methods between-subjects double-blind design, 
involving two groups: one group (Simulated Malingerers) was instructed to 
malinger while completing the assessments, and the second group (Control) 
was instructed to perform to the best of their abilities. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of the two groups as follows: each participant 
chose one of two sets of instructions presented to them (Appendix 3). These 
instructions were presented blank side up, so that participants were unaware 
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of which set they were selecting. Likewise, the researcher was blind to which 
set of instructions the participant had selected.  
 
Follow-up open-ended items were also asked of all participants, providing the 
qualitative strand to this study. 
 
2.3 Power  
In order to complete a power calculation, an extensive review of the 
malingering literature was carried out, specifically, as it pertains to simulated 
malingering involving a student sample and a well-validated malingering 
measure. Very few such studies have reported effect sizes for their findings, 
and of those that have, Bagby and his team’s finding of an effect size of 0.53 
is the most conservative (Bagby, Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder & Bury, 2002).   
 
This effect size indicates that the measures in question (in this case, the 
malingering scales of the Personality Assessment Inventory) (Morey, 1991) 
were moderately effective in distinguishing simulated malingering from honest 
test-takers; the sample size required to obtain adequate power (0.80) to 
detect a moderate effect size at α =.05 is n= 70, that is, 35 participants per 
group (Cohen, 1988).  
 
2.4. Participants  
The major inclusion criteria were that participants a) could read and 
understand English; b) were over the age of 18 and c) granted their informed 
consent to participate. All participants in this instance were recruited from the 
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Royal Holloway University of London student body. Sixty-four students in total 
participated in this study, and of this group, 62 produced valid tests; one 
participant completed fewer than half of the RSPM items, and another 
participant ended their FTP assessment prematurely. Neither of these 
participants were included in the subsequent analyses.  
 
The mean age of the sample (N=62) was 19.5 (S.D.=3.62) years, with a range 
of 18 to 41 years of age; the sample comprised 10 males and 52 females.   
 
Thirty students were self-selected to the Simulated Malingerers group and 32 
were in the Control group.  
 
2.4.1. Recruitment 
The majority of the participants (N=63) were recruited through the Royal 
Holloway University research participation scheme. This scheme facilitates 
undergraduate Psychology students’ participation in campus research to 
obtain research credits, a certain number of which are necessary to fulfil their 
course requirements. This study was advertised through this research 
participation portal, and credits were granted to students electronically upon 
their completion of the study.  
 
The study was also advertised University-wide to non-Psychology students 
(Appendix 4); these students were offered a prize incentive of the opportunity 
to win an Amazon voucher worth £25 each. Only one participant was recruited 
via these means, and was awarded their prize voucher upon completion of the 
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data collection phase. It is unclear why, despite campus-wide advertising, 
more students did not sign up to participate in the study via the prize-draw 
route.     
 
Data were collected between November 2015 and March 2016. Data 
collection was terminated at the end of March 2016 as, despite the sample 
size of 70 not being achieved, there were simply no more participants signing 
up to participate in the study; the research participation scheme required 
students to have earned their research credits by April 2016 and thus the 
majority of the student sample had achieved their credits by this stage and 
were no longer available for research participation.  
 
2.5. Measures  
2.5.1. Overview of measures 
 
This study aimed to investigate how effective the FTP is at detecting 
malingering, via its malingering items; in order to be able to conclude whether 
the FTP is capable of detecting malingering, it was important to be able to 
determine whether or not participants who were instructed to malinger were, 
in fact, attempting to malinger. To this end, participants were also required to 
simulate malingering on an independent measure (the RSPM), with an 
established record of malingering detection. Control participants performed to 
the best of their ability on both measures.  
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Finally, so as to address Research questions 3 and 4 (pertaining to 
participants’ knowledge regarding fitness to plead and ideas about methods of 
malingering), some short post-testing qualitative questions were posed to 
participants, described below.  
 
2.5.2. The Fitness to Plead “FTP” tool  (Blackwood, Brown, Brewer, 
Appiah-Kusi, Peay & Watts, in preparation) consists of a film vignette and 
several questions designed to assess the participant’s fitness to plead; as 
indicated by the Law Commission’s consultation (Law Commission, 2010), 
this measure focuses on the individual’s decision-making capacity in relation 
to the trial process.    
 
The interview comprises both closed and open-ended items, as well as 
prompts for further information. There are 29 ‘scored’ items in total, plus four 
malingering items which do not contribute to the individual’s score on the FTP 
(See Appendix 5 for the FTP in full, with malingering items highlighted). 
     
It is important to note that the FTP is currently being validated and has not 
been launched, as of yet. The following relates to the initial development of 
the measure (Brown, Stahl, Appiah-Kusi, Brewer, Watts, Peay & Blackwood, 
in preparation) 
 
Four experienced criminal barristers, together with the research group, 
scripted an excerpt based on trial material concerning a case of unlawful 
wounding (Actual Bodily Harm, or ABH) and then filmed the excerpt using 
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actors in Southwark Crown Court.  This resulted in a twenty-minute 
ecologically valid representation of typical Crown Court proceedings. The 
filmed material included point-of-view discussions of case details with the 
defence team before entering the court, a typical exchange between a key 
witness and the prosecution barrister, a brief period of cross-examination of 
this witness by a defence barrister, a discussion during a break in the 
proceedings with the defence barrister concerning case progress  and the 
decision to give evidence, and final questions from the judge concerning the 
defendant’s decision to give evidence (or not).  
 
Meanwhile, at a meeting of experts convened by the Law Commission, the 
concept of fitness as currently determined, was reviewed with psychiatrists, 
psychologists, legal academics, legal practitioners and interested lay persons 
contributing to the process. A list of potential items felt to address the 
construct of fitness to plead was drawn up by the expert group; based on 
these items, questions were scripted to be asked in between the film scenes, 
assessing the respondent’s generic courtroom knowledge and comprehension 
of the film vignette they were viewing. Specifically, these questions assessed 
case and plea comprehension (understanding of the charge, comprehension 
of the distinction between a plea of guilty or not guilty), evidence 
comprehension (factual memory of evidence including errors/disagreement 
therein and probing of the ability to explain why statements were in 
error/disagreement) and other aspects of the trial process (understanding of 
the roles of court personnel and processes). The film and the initial 
accompanying questions and scoring guide were reviewed by legal, 
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psychiatric and psychological experts for content validity, ensuring that the 
film had face validity and that the list of questions was comprehensive. This 
led to an initially relatively lengthy scale that was then carefully examined 
empirically to determine which items should be eliminated, modified or 
retained.  
 
During the alpha testing phase, participants were recruited from a general 
population sample; 160 participants were recruited, all of whom spoke English 
as their first language, with an age range of 18-81 (Mean age = 45.7 years, 
S.D. =18.3). Participants were stratified to ensure approximately equal 
numbers of subjects in each of three ability bands (‘below average’, ‘average’ 
and ‘above average’ as determined by Wechsler Adult Intelligent Scale – 
Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV) scores) and balanced so as to have approximately 
equal numbers of men and women in each of the four age groups. 
Participants had no reported lifetime history of major mental disorder 
symptomatology or prior criminal convictions/cautions.  
 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were appearing in a Crown Court 
trial. They were given a brief outline of the charge ‘they’ were facing and of 
key prosecution evidence against them. Subjects were asked to recount what 
they had understood about the charge, and once their adequate 
understanding was ensured, they proceeded to watch the court case film, 
answering the standardised interview questions between scenes.  
The initial 42 item scale was administered and refined using standard item 
reduction methods in two iterative rounds of testing; the resulting 29-item 
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scale was examined for concurrent validity in a final round of testing. As there 
is no current ‘gold standard’ measure in the area, it was not possible to 
compare the current measure with an existing criterion measure. However, 
other aspects of concurrent validity were explored, namely convergent validity 
(predicted correlations with cognitive function measures such as full scale IQ) 
and known group validity (by comparing differences as predicted between 
groups with predicted high levels of the trait i.e. ‘normal subjects’ and groups 
with low levels of the trait i.e. ‘learning disabled subjects’). The internal 
consistency of the scale was retested and a factor analysis conducted to see 
whether the scale is uni-dimensional or not. It has emerged that the FTP has 
an underlying two-factor structure: one factor assessing foundational abilities, 
and the other factor relating to decision-making abilities in the courtroom 
context (P. Brown, personal communication, May 20, 2016) 
 
It is not envisaged that cut-off scores will be established for the FTP; rather, 
the tool will be used as part of a larger clinical assessment, with the 
defendant’s performance on the tool guiding the clinician in their 
determination of fitness or unfitness to plead.  
 
2.5.3 The Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices 
The Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM), first described in Raven 
(Raven, 1941), and later updated (Raven, Styles & Raven, 1998), consist of 
five sets of 12 different matrices (A, B, C, D & E), with each successive set 
increasing in difficulty. For each item, the respondent is required to select 
which of the shapes in the array complete the larger object. Intended primarily 
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as a test of IQ or general ability (Raven, 2000), it has more recently been re-
purposed as a test of malingering (Sellers, Byrne & Golus, 2006). The RSPM 
functions as a test of malingering by enabling the clinician to inspect the 
respondent’s performance curve, that is, the range of their performance 
across easy/difficult items; the key factor here is that malingerers may not 
consider item difficulty when deciding which answers to fail (Conroy & 
Kwartner, 2006), resulting in an atypical curve. 
 
Gudjonsson and colleagues were the first to develop a specific method by 
which performance curve anomalies could be used to identify malingering, 
using the ‘rate of decay’ formula of (2A+B) - (D+2E), where A, B, D and E 
refer to the scores obtained by the participant in the respective RSPM set 
(Gudjonsson & Shackleton, 1986).  This formula compares the number of 
correct answers for the first 24 items against the number of correct answers 
for the last 24 items (the ‘rate of decay’), with the resulting score compared 
against a set of cut-off numbers derived from the expected, theoretical rate of 
decay (Andrade et al., 2001). Gudjonsson validated this formula using a 
medium-sized sample of simulated malingerers versus control group and 
found that the rate of decay formula proved superior to the more basic 
discrepancy method suggested by Raven in discriminating malingerers and 
honest performers (Gudjonsson & Shackleton, 1986). 
  
This ‘rate of decay’ formula was further validated in another study involving a 
much larger sample, again comprising simulated malingerers and a control 
group; this study indicated that the RSPM  yields a 5% false positive rate, and 
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a 26% false negative rate; it further notes that if a base population rate of 
malingering is assumed to be 10%, then a result of “normal” on the basis of 
the rate of decay formula has a 97% chance of being correct, and a result of 
“faked” has a 63% chance of being correct (McKinzey et al., 1999).  
 
Finally, another study involving an undergraduate sample, with one group 
instructed to malinger cognitive deficits and another to malinger 
psychopathology (and a third control group), indicated that the RSPM was 
equally sensitive to the malingering of cognitive deficits and psychopathology 
(Sellers, Byrne & Golus, 2006).  
 
The current study will employ the rate of decay formula, as described above.  
 
2.5.4. Post-testing Qualitative items 
Finally, the third ‘measure’ is not a formal measure as such, but rather some 
brief open-ended questions (four in total) that will be referred to as the “Post-
testing qualitative items”. 
 
These items were intended to provide information about the ‘obviousness’ of 
the malingering items of the FTP, as well as to elicit information about the 
participants’ understanding or otherwise of the concept of fitness to plead, and 
to clarify the nature of their attempts at malingering (i.e., whether they were 
malingering memory problems, learning difficulties, or any number of other 
possibilities). 
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These items were asked of participants following their completion of both the 
FTP and the RSPM, and are as follows: 
(i) “While you were completing the video test, were there any 
questions that I asked you that you thought were designed to check 
whether you were performing to the best of your abilities?” 
(prompt if required): “Were there any questions that seemed quite 
easy or obvious?”.  
 
(ii)  “Did you receive instructions A or instructions B?” 
 
(iii)  “Had you heard of the term unfit to plead/ or unfit to stand trial 
before? What do you understand this to mean?” 
 
(iv) If participant had indicated that they received instructions A (i.e. the 
control group instructions), the following question was asked: 
 
“If you had received Instructions B, you would have been told to try 
to be found unfit to plead. What kind of ways could you have 
attempted to be found unfit?” 
 
If participant had indicated that they received instructions B (i.e. the 
simulated malingering instructions), the following question was 
asked: 
 
 “In what ways did you attempt to be found unfit to plead?” 
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2.6. Procedure  
2.6.1. Piloting  
The two measures (FTP, RSPM) and the Post-testing Qualitative items were 
administered to two adults during the piloting phase; this resulted in the minor 
re-wording of Instructions B, specifically clarifying that the participant will be 
imagining that they themselves have been charged with a crime, but the film 
to assess their understanding of trial process will involve someone else’s trial, 
as well as a reminder to read the instructions again and take some time to 
prepare (Appendix 3). These two participants were not included in the main 
analyses.  
 
2.6.2. Pre-testing: Consent and Demographics 
At the outset of the testing, participants read an information sheet (Appendix 
5) about the study and completed a consent form (Appendix 6). It was 
explained therein that they were free to withdraw, without prejudice, at any 
point in the study. Participants also completed a short demographics form, 
asking them to indicate their age, gender, course of study, and previous 
contact with the criminal justice system (Appendix 7).  
Participants were then directed to select one of two sets of Instructions from 
the table in front of them (concealed); they were told not to indicate to the 
researcher which set of instructions they had received, and to inform the 
researcher when they had finished reading the instructions (Appendix 8).  
 
 
 
57 
 
2.6.3. Study Instructions 
As above, participants randomly selected one of two sets of instructions; 
either Instructions A or Instructions B.  
Instructions A: 
• “I would like you to imagine that you have been charged with a crime 
and are meeting with your allocated psychologist to do some tests 
before a trial can proceed. These tests will involve watching a video 
and answering questions about it. You will then be asked to do some 
short visual recognition tasks.  
• Please answer all questions/ complete all tasks to the best of your 
ability”. 
Instructions B: 
• “I would like you to imagine that you have been charged with a crime 
and are meeting with your allocated psychologist to do some tests 
before a trial can proceed. These tests will involve watching a video 
and answering questions about it. You will then be asked to do some 
short visual recognition tasks.  
• In the video task, you will be watching SOMEONE ELSE’s FICTIONAL 
TRIAL. This video task will explore your understanding of trials.  
PLEASE NOTE:  I would like for you to imagine that you are very keen to 
avoid having to    stand trial for your own crime. You have therefore decided 
that you want to be found to be UNFIT to stand trial. Throughout your meeting 
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with your psychologist, when answering video questions/ visual tasks, you 
must try your hardest to be found UNFIT to stand trial. 
HOWEVER: please also remember that you should not be so obvious that the 
examiner picks up on your attempts to perform below your abilities. If you are 
detected, you WILL have to stand trial.” 
Please read these instructions again to be sure you have understood.  
Take some time to prepare how you will be found “unfit” to stand trial”. 
 
2.6.4. Testing stage 
Once participants indicated to the researcher that they had finished reading 
their instructions, the researcher joined the participant and introduced 
themselves as the ‘participant’s allocated psychologist’ and informed the 
participant that they would now be beginning the video element of their 
assessment.  
The FTP tool was then administered, utilising the prompts where required, as 
per the tool (Appendix 5).  
Once the FTP was completed, the participant was invited to begin the RSPM. 
At this point, the researcher reminded the participant that whatever 
instructions they had received at the outset still applied for this section of the 
assessment. The participant was told that their completion of the RSPM would 
not be timed, but that they should provide an answer for each item, in order, 
and without skipping any. They were told that they should inform the 
researcher once they had completed this task.  
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 2.6.5. Post-testing stage 
Once the participant had completed the RSPM, the researcher explained to 
them that the testing phase was now over. The ‘Post-testing Qualitative items’ 
were asked, and participants were invited to ask any questions they had 
about the research. Finally, participants were provided with a debriefing 
information sheet, outlining the researcher contact details, and those of the 
Student Counselling Service, should they have been in anyway upset by their 
involvement in the research (Appendix 2).  
 
2.7. Data analysis 
Data were entered into SPSS and frequencies were analysed and parametric 
tests (t-tests) were carried out. The ‘Post-testing Qualitative items’ were 
analysed using Content Analysis. Content Analysis is an especially suitable 
methodology when there is not enough existing information regarding the 
topic of interest and the researcher wishes to be led by the data rather than 
pre-determined themes (Elo & Kyngas, 2008).Following the approach 
described by Dispenza and colleagues, a data-driven, inductive content 
analysis was carried out in three stages: preparation, organising and reporting 
(Dispenza, Harper & Harrigan, 2016).  
 
During the preparation phase, it was decided that themes would be the 
primary unit of analysis. The data was read through multiple times, without 
coding. During the organisation phase, an inductive and comparative method 
was used to code all of the responses. After the researcher completed this 
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phase, an independent rater was invited to code each of the responses, 
according to the established themes; some of the responses contained more 
than one theme.  
  
Once agreement had been reached, the themes were grouped into higher 
order themes where possible, and the original responses revisited to ensure 
data saturation (Dispenza, et al., 2016) 
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Chapter 3 Results 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to address the research  
questions. Quantitative analyses were initially performed on the between-
subjects data, comparing the Simulated Malingerers group with the Control 
group with respect to their performances on the Fitness to Plead (FTP) tool 
and the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM).  
 
Qualitative analysis, namely Content Analysis, was then used to analyse 
participants’ answers to the post-testing open-ended questions.  
 
3.2.  Data preparation 
Of the 64 participants who were assessed, 62 produced valid tests; one 
participant completed less than half of the RSPM items, and another 
participant ended their FTP assessment prematurely. Neither of these 
participants were included in the subsequent analyses.  
 
The data for 62 participants were entered manually into SPSS, and were 
inspected for errors; none were found.  
  
3.2.1. Inspection for outliers 
Visual inspection of boxplots and Q-Q plots indicated two potential outliers. 
The Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) was calculated for the sample. The 
use of the sample mean and standard deviation to determine outliers is 
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problematic as both are themselves influenced by the presence of outliers; the 
most robust detector of outliers within univariate statistical analyses is 
therefore the Median Absolute Deviation (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard & Licata, 
2013). Outliers are defined as such if they exceed the median sample value, 
plus or minus 2.5 times the MAD. Using this calculation6, one case was 
determined as an outlier. However, conducting the analyses with and without 
this case did not affect the outcome.  
 
3.2.2. Assumptions of normality. 
Visual inspection of the histograms and Q-Q plots for the distributions of the 
Control (Group A) and Simulated Malingerers’ (Group B) scores on the FTP 
and the RSPM indicated that there was some skewness within the FTP Group 
B distribution (negatively skewed, Z= -2.07), and within the RSPM Group A 
distribution (negatively skewed, Z= -2.2). Although both of these Z-scores 
depart significantly from zero, at the conservative alpha level of .05, they are 
not significant at the alpha level of .01. All groups met the assumption of 
normality using the Shapiro-Wilks test.  
 
With regard to the moderate skewness observed within two of the data 
subsets above, it has been indicated that in studies with an N> 30 or 40, 
violations of normality of distribution should not prohibit the use of robust 
parametric tests, such as a t-test or ANOVA (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012); 
 6 Median Absolute Deviation is calculated by computing the sample median, and then subtracting the median from 
all values in the series, resulting in a new variable. The median of this new variable is then determined, and multiplied 
by 1.4826 to obtain  the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD).  
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therefore, given the current study’s sample size, parametric analyses can 
proceed. 
    
3.3. Description of sample 
      
Table 1, below, summarises some basic demographics for the current 
sample. The mean age of the sample (M= 19.5, S.D.= 3.62) reflects the 
predominantly first year undergraduate population recruited. All participants 
completed a Research Participation Scheme pre-screen questionnaire, which 
recorded information relating to their ethnicity and their native language, 
illustrated below.  
 
At the beginning of the research interview, participants completed a 
demographic form, which recorded age, sex and whether or not the 
participant had/ has any previous or ongoing involvement with the criminal 
justice system. One participant responded “Yes” to this item, indicating that 
they had been involved in court proceedings as a victim. This information was 
provided confidentially and prior to the testing phase, and is included here to 
merely to characterise the scope or otherwise of the sample’s prior 
engagement with the criminal justice system.  
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Table 1: Sample Demographic data  
Variable (n=62) Mean (SD)/ Frequency Range/ Percentage 
                 
     Age 
    Sex 
               Male                                 
               Female 
    Ethnicity 
                White 
                Asian 
                Black 
                Mixed 
                Other 
 
     Native Language 
spoken 
                   English 
                    Other 
 
Contact with criminal      
justice system 
                    Yes 
                    No 
 
19.5 (3.62) 
 
10 
52 
 
48 
10 
2 
1 
1 
 
 
 
49 
13 
 
 
 
                 1 
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18-41 
 
16.1 
83.9 
 
77.4 
16.1 
3.2 
1.6 
1.6 
 
 
 
79.03 
20.96 
 
 
 
                 1.6 
98.4 
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The distribution of age, gender, ethnicity and native language spoken did not 
differ significantly across Group A and Group B (t(60)= .21, p=n.s., χ2 (1)= 
0.34, p= n.s., χ2 (1)=0.03, p= n.s.). 
  
3.4. Main Analyses  
 
3.4.1. Research Question 1 
“What are the sensitivity, specificity, and negative/ positive predictive values 
of the FTP with regards to malingering?”  
 
To answer this question, frequency data were required, specifically with 
regard to whether or not a participant was rated as malingering on either the 
FTP or the RSPM.  
 
In the current study, the RSPM acts as the criterion measure of malingering; 
each participant achieved an overall RSPM score, as well as a categorical 
‘Valid’ or ‘Invalid’ result, obtained by calculating the rate of decay. The rate of 
decay is calculated by summing the number of correct answers in each 
subset (A to E) and applying the rate of decay formula of ((2*A) + B)- (D +(2* 
E)). The ‘cut-off’ score is determined by the total RSPM score (as validated in 
the original Gudjonsson & Shackleton study); the individual RSPM 
performance is considered ‘invalid’, i.e., to be indicative of malingering, if the 
rate of decay is below the cut-off associated with the individual’s total score 
(McKinzey et al., 1999). 
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With regards to the FTP tool, malingering is indicated if the individual 
endorses any of the four malingering items (See highlighted in Appendix 5).  
 
Table 2, below, indicates the numbers of participants identified as malingering 
or not, by both the FTP and the RSPM and Table 3 depicts this information 
according to Participant Group (Control vs Simulated Malingerers).  
 
Table 2: Malingering vs non-malingering frequencies within the sample 
 Malingering as per RSPM Not-malingering as 
per RSPM 
Malingering as per FTP 1 4 
Not malingering as per 
FTP 
6 51 
 
Table 3: Malingering vs non-malingering frequencies, by Participant Group 
 Malingering as per RSPM Not-malingering 
as per RSPM 
Malingering as per FTP 1 Control 3 Simulated 
Malingerers 
1 Control 
Not malingering as per 
FTP 
4 Simulated Malingerers 
2 Control 
25 Simulated 
Malingerers 
26 Control 
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Using this information, the sensitivity, specificity and predictive values of the 
FTP can be determined: 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity, Specificity and Positive and Negative Predictive Values of 
the FTP 
FTP    % value 
Sensitivity       14.3 
Specificity       92.7 
Positive Predictive Value       20 
Negative Predictive Value       10.5  
 
It is evident from Table 4 that relying on the endorsing, or not, of the four 
malingering items of the FTP results in poor sensitivity, positive and negative 
predictive values for the FTP with regard to malingering detection.  
 
The specificity value of 92.7% is suggestive of the FTP’s ability to correctly 
identify a non-malingering participant.    
 
As can be seen from Table 3, 25 (78%) participants from Group B (Simulated 
Malingerers) were not identified as malingering by either the RSPM rate of 
decay formula or the FTP malingering items; this raises the question of 
whether or not participants within this group were in fact attempting to 
malinger, which required supplementary analyses.  
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 3.4.2. Supplementary Analyses in support of Research Question 1 
In order to ascertain whether or not participants within Group B were 
attempting to malinger it is necessary to compare the overall scores obtained 
on the FTP and the RSPM for both Group A and Group B.  
 
Table 5: Mean overall scores for Group A and Group B on the FTP and the 
RSPM 
  FTP Mean Score ( S.D.) RSPM Mean Score/ 
S.D. 
Group A (Control) 
 
52.97 (6.26) 48.23 (5.9) 
Group B (Simulated 
Malingerers) 
 
49.25 (6.01) 42.31(8.20) 
 
 
An independent t-test was used to compare the overall FTP scores of Group 
A (Control) and Group B (Simulated Malingerers). The simulated malingerers 
scored significantly lower than controls on the FTP (t (60) = 2.34, p < .01).  
 
An independent t-test was also used to compare the overall RSPM scores of 
Group A and Group B. The simulated malingers scored significantly lower 
than controls on the RSPM (t(60)= 3.24, p<.01).  
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3.4.3.  Research Question 1- Qualitative observations 
It is noted that, upon inspection of Simulated Malingerers responses across 
the tool generally, there were some quite ‘bizarre’ responses provided. For 
example, in response to the question of “What is the role of the jury?”, one 
respondent replied that they “just sit there and watch…maybe they provide 
family support?”, while others replied that “the jury is just the audience” and 
that “(the jury) perhaps collects the evidence”. More than one respondent 
indicated that pleading not guilty would mean that the defendant would be free 
to go, without a trial; some respondents displayed a lack of knowledge around 
the role of the judge, with one suggesting that the judge’s role is to “just take 
statements”. Finally, several respondents indicated quite extreme suggestions 
for sentences for the ABH crime described in the tool, with one respondent 
suggesting that an individual would likely receive a sentence of 25 years in 
prison for the crime (which, for reference, was a relatively minor ABH assault). 
 
3.5. Research Question 2 
 
Which of the specific FTP malingering items are the most/least successful at 
identifying malingerers? 
 
As referred to in answering Research Question 1, very few participants 
endorsed any of the malingering items; 5 participants in total endorsed any of 
the malingering items (8%).  
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 The malingering items are as follows: 
 
1. Had David Mullen mentioned before that the person that attacked 
him was holding something? Yes or No 
2. Did David Mullen say someone hit him? Yes or No 
3. Was David Mullen injured? Yes or No 
4. Did David Mullen say if he managed to strike the person or not? 
Yes or No 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Frequency with which the malingering items were endorsed 
 
As can be seen, Item 1 was endorsed once, and each of Items 2-4 were 
endorsed on two occasions.  
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As the actual numbers in question are so small, no meaningful analysis 
beyond the frequency comparison here can be conducted.  
 
3.5.1. Research Question 2: Qualitative analysis 
 
However, Research Question 2 was also addressed by the post-testing item 
asked which was: 
 
“Were there any questions that I asked you that you thought were designed to 
check whether you were performing to the best of your abilities?” 
 
Using the Content Analysis approach described previously, the following 
themes were identified from the responses: 
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Figure 2: Frequency chart for the occurrence of themes across the sample’s 
responses to the underperforming question.  
 
From Figure 2 above, it can be seen that participants believed that certain 
questions had been asked so as to determine whether or not they were 
understanding the information in the video, and whether or not they were 
paying attention to the video (Themes 1 and 2). Certain themes frequently co-
occurred; for example, several participants who referred to there having been 
questions that were checking if they were paying attention (Theme 2), 
specifically mentioned the first question of the tool, which asked participants 
to recount the night of the offence (Theme 4), after they had just heard it 
described on the video.  
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As can be seen from Figure 2, the theme most frequently endorsed by 
participants in response to the question as to whether there had been items 
included to detect underperforming, was theme 6, i.e. ‘No/ none that I can 
recall’.  
 
This is closely followed by Theme 3 (Very obvious/easy items) and Theme 2  
(Checking if I was paying attention), which were mentioned 13 and 11 times 
respectively across the sample. Examples of the types of responses that 
participants gave include “It seemed like lots of questions were checking if I 
had been paying attention” and “Some seemed very easy, to check if I’d been 
listening- e.g. (the question) if he had been hit or not”.  This highlighted 
response was the only specific reference to any of the malingering items of 
the FTP. Several other respondents singled out questions that they had 
remembered as particularly obvious, such as “there were simple questions, 
such as what is evidence”, “maybe some quite easy, e.g. what is the role of 
the jury- some quite obvious, like the ‘rate your agreement’ ones”.  
 
 
3.6. Research Question 3 
What do participants understand fitness to plead to comprise? 
The relevant post-testing question here is as follows: 
 
“Have you heard of the term unfit to plead/ or unfit to stand trial before? What 
do you understand this to mean?” 
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As above, a thematic content analysis was carried out, also following the 
steps outlined previously. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency chart for the occurrence of themes in response to the 
question of what fitness to plead means 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, there were a wide range of themes 
characterising the participants’ understanding of fitness to plead. Within 
Theme 1, the most frequently occurring, participants referred to specific 
conditions, such as depression, mania, schizophrenia, post-natal depression 
and anxiety. However, there were also several other participants who 
potentially referred to mental health problems in a more vague manner, 
captured by Theme 9 ‘Unstable/ unsound mind’. For example, some 
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participants referred to someone being “mentally unstable”/ “mental instability” 
or “not psychologically sound”.  
 
Within Theme 2, participants referred to the possibility that someone would be 
found unfit if they had “some kind of learning disability”, if they had “severe 
autism”, or “someone not having a grasp of the system….if they’ve not 
developed to adult level”. This showed some overlap with Theme 10 ‘Difficulty 
with the court process’: within this theme, some participants specifically 
referred to unfitness relating to the person not being able to “understand the 
court process, take on advice or stand up for themselves”, as well as those 
who “might not be in a strong enough mindset to plead their case”.  
 
Within Theme 3, participants mentioned “memory problems” “amnesia” and 
“dementia” as possible reasons why someone might be found unfit; answers 
within Theme 4 included reference to serious physical health problems or 
injury as reasons why someone would be found unfit to plead.  
 
Participant responses that were categorised within Theme 5 ‘Trauma/ 
bereavement’ included those that indicated a person might be unfit to plead if 
they “were in shock/ trauma”, “if something happened, like a bereavement”, or 
“might feel too traumatised”.  
 
Theme 6 comprised references to insanity and diminished responsibility; for 
example, someone might be found unfit to plead if they were “not in state to 
be in court- kind of like insanity”, they would be “unable to stand trial if insane” 
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or that fitness to plead is something to do with mental state “as to whether 
you’re mentally able to have committed a crime- like mens rea, diminished 
responsibility” and “for example, women after giving birth- post-natal 
depression, would have a diminished responsibility”.   
 
Theme 7 encompasses participants’ references to the issue of inebriation 
within fitness to plead; for example, if someone was “maybe too drunk”, 
“…intoxicated and therefore can’t recall and are unreliable” or that if someone 
was “drunk, (they) can’t be accountable for own actions”.  
 
Finally, theme 8 refers to an individual’s age as a reason for why someone 
might be found unfit to plead: “(unfit to stand trial) could mean too young”, “if 
someone wasn’t capable- children”, “if they were too young for trial” and “if 
they were a kid”.  
 
3.7. Research Question 4 
 
What ‘profiles’ of malingering do respondents instructed to malinger enact? 
    
The relevant post-testing question here is: 
  “In what ways did you attempt to be found unfit to plead?” 
 
Or, if participant was a control participant:  
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“If you had received Instructions B, you would have been told to try to be 
found unfit to plead. What kind of ways could you have attempted to be found 
unfit?” 
 
 
Figure 4. Frequency chart for the occurrence of themes in response to the 
question of how participants had/would try to be found unfit.  
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, participants suggested that they had tried or 
would try several different strategies so as to be found unfit.  
 
Theme 1 ‘Feigned Understanding Difficulties’, the most frequently endorsed, 
related to participants’ comments that they had answered or would answer in 
a way that would somehow indicate impaired understanding. For example: “I 
responded but not in full detail, to show less understanding” “(tried to seem) 
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stuck, confused, and not really getting it…maybe like a mild learning disability” 
“I would have…pretended to have…poor understanding of court” and “I tried 
not understanding what charge was- but I tried to be subtle. For some 
questions, I answered a bit confused”.  
 
Theme 2 related to participants underperforming on the patterns so as to 
seem unfit.  For example: “I purposely tried to get some questions wrong on 
the patterns”; “On the patterns, for some of them I chose the wrong one, but 
not on the really obvious ones”.  
 
Theme 3 ‘Feigned Memory Difficulties’ characterised another strategy 
employed by participants so as to seem unfit. Responses included                 
“I pretended not to remember details”; “pretended to have memory problems” 
and “I would try seem...like I had a bad memory”.  Within Theme 4 ‘Tried to 
Seem Innocent’ was the indication that participants had believed I was asking 
them to find Sam (the character in the video) unfit to stand trial (rather than 
the video being a part of their own assessment of fitness to plead). For 
example, participants observed “I believed what the story was and tried to be 
honest”; “I felt that the evidence against Sam was not very strong anyway, so 
didn’t feel the need to prove myself too much- confident (Sam) wouldn’t be 
charged anyway” and also, that “I understood that I/Sam needed to be found 
innocent so I tried my best to pay attention and seem innocent”.  
 
Theme 5 ‘Personal Characteristics’ encompasses different aspects of 
personality/ mental state that participants attempted to convey/ would attempt 
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to convey so as to be found unfit. Participants mentioned that they “tried to be 
rude”, they “acted like I didn’t really care, not taking it seriously” or that they 
“tried being exaggerated and focusing on emotionality rather than evidence” 
or “(tried) to be very nervous/ worried/ stressed and unsure of myself”. In 
terms of things they suggested that they could have tried, participants noted “I 
(could) have gotten very angry…to give the idea that I’m just a bit unstable” 
and “I probably should have been a bit upset or a bit bizarre”, or “being 
awkward and unco-operative”.  
 
Finally, Theme 6 ‘Didn’t know how to seem unfit/didn’t try’ emerged from 
participants responses to the effect that they had not known what strategy to 
employ to try to be found unfit. For example: “I didn’t try anything because I 
wasn’t sure if I knew what it meant properly”; “I just answered quite normally- 
couldn’t think of what to do, just answered normally” and “I forgot”.  
 
The full implications, as well as limitations, of the foregoing results will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This study was designed so as to provide validation for the Fitness to Plead 
(FTP) tool with regard to its ability to detect attempts to malinger on it, as well 
as to provide an insight into the lay understanding of fitness to plead and how 
unfitness can be malingered.  
 
As was explored in the Introduction, the assessment of malingering should be 
a fundamental component of a pre-trial fitness to plead evaluation. Research 
in this area has typically been conducted using American samples, assessing 
“competence to stand trial” (CST). Several specific CST assessment 
measures have been developed for use in the U.S.A., (e.g. the “Evaluation of 
Competency to Stand Trial-Revised (ECST-R)”, Rogers, Tilbrook & Sewell, 
2004) some including inbuilt malingering scales, with such standardised 
assessment tools reported to be used relatively routinely and successfully 
(Rogers et al., 2008).  The only measure available for measuring fitness to 
plead, to date, had been the MacCAT-FP, which, for several reasons, seems 
to have received negligible attention in the literature and was not integrated 
into clinical assessments of fitness to plead. The revised construct of fitness 
to plead, emphasising decision-making capacity, has necessitated a new 
measure, and as such there are no existing equivalent measures with which 
the current study’s results can be directly compared. However, the results do 
provide valuable further validation data for the FTP, a tentative baseline for 
the detection of malingering on this measure, as well as qualitative 
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information regarding a lay population’s conceptions of fitness to plead and 
manifestations of “unfitness”, which will hopefully contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between malingering and fitness to plead.  
 
4.2. Research Questions 1 and 2 
 
Q.1 What are the sensitivity, specificity, and negative/ positive predictive 
values of  the FTP with regards to malingering?; 
Q.2 Which of the specific FTP malingering items are the most/least successful 
at identifying malingerers? 
 
What this study has demonstrated, using the Ravens Standard Progressive 
Matrices (RSPM) as its criterion measure, is the FTP’s apparent poor 
sensitivity, positive and negative predictive value with respect to malingering 
on the basis of its current malingering items alone. Inspection of the data has 
revealed that in fact very few of the participants (<6%) in the “Simulated 
Malingerers” group (i.e. with instructions to malinger), endorsed any of the 
specific malingering items on the tool.  Analyses revealed that the “Simulated 
Malingerers” group did score significantly lower in terms of their overall scores 
than the “Control” group which would be suggestive of attempts to follow the 
instructions to malinger. Perhaps, therefore, it was the case that participants 
chose to underperform on other items of the test, but not on the malingering 
items themselves. As is indicated by the fact that some seemingly bizarre or 
notably incorrect responses were offered by those within the “Simulated 
Malingerers” group (Section 3.4.3 of Results), participants may have 
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attempted to portray the profile of someone unfit to plead via their responses 
to the more open-ended questions, rather than to deliberately make an error 
on a straightforward “yes/no” question.  
 
On the one hand, this could be taken as an indication that the FTP tool 
perhaps requires more subtle malingering items to boost its ability to 
definitively detect malingering attempts. The malingering items form a floor 
effect detection strategy, as all are very easy items that most normal 
individuals would be expected to answer correctly (Rogers, Sewell, Grandjean 
& Vitaco, 2002), suggesting possibly that those providing the wrong answer 
are attempting to portray either some sort of cognitive impairment, or a 
memory difficulty (as the items relate to information the participant has 
recently heard). While, as will be discussed later, several participants indeed 
reported that their strategy was to portray some cognitive or memory 
difficulties, it would appear that their attempts at doing so did not include 
‘failing’ these particular malingering items.  
 
4.2.1. Post-testing Qualitative item for Research question 2 
Relevant here is item 1 from the Post-testing Qualitative items, which asked  
participants if there had been any items that they had thought had been   
included so as to check if they had performed to the best of their abilities.  
 
The most frequently occurring theme here was “No/none that I can recall”, 
with some 16 respondents indicating that they had not noticed any items that 
were designed to check if they were performing to the best of their abilities. 
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However, some 13 respondents noted that there had been some ‘very easy/ 
obvious’ questions asked, and 11 respondents noted that there had been 
questions designed to see if they were paying attention. While most 
participants were unable to recall specific items when probed for examples, it 
is possible that a number of these participants may have noted that the 
malingering items were particularly easy or obvious as they were being asked, 
and, in the case of the Simulated Malingerers group, ones to avoid failing. 
Only one respondent specifically mentioned a malingering item:  “Some 
seemed very easy, to check if I’d been listening- e.g. (the question) if he had 
been hit or not”; the fact that no other participants mentioned one of the 
malingering items may indicate that these items perhaps did not stand out 
especially from the other items. In fact, as was noted in the results section, 
several other respondents singled out other items that they  had remembered 
as particularly obvious, such as “there were simple questions, such as what is 
evidence”, “ maybe some quite easy, e.g. what is the role of the jury”; “some 
quite obvious, like the ‘rate your agreement’ ones”. On the basis of the overall 
responses to this question, it would seem that the malingering items 
themselves did not particularly ‘stand out’ to the participants from the other 
items, and that for many participants, they may have simply found several of 
the items on the questionnaire to be quite easy, not merely the malingering 
items. The fact remains, however, that the Simulated Malingerers group 
performed significantly worse than the Control group, but did so without being 
detected by any of these four malingering items, resulting in the low sensitivity 
rate obtained in this study.   
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4.2.2. The FTP versus established CST measures, in relation to 
malingering detection 
  
As mentioned above, the FTP has been developed to measure a newly 
defined version of fitness to plead, focusing on decision-making capacity, and 
as such, there are no existing equivalent fitness to plead measures with which 
it can be directly compared. Furthermore, as it stands, the only other existing 
fitness to plead measure, the MacCAT-FP, does not include items to detect 
malingering (Akinkunmi, 2002). However, we can compare the efficacy of the 
FTP in detecting simulated malingering to that of other much-researched 
measures of competency to stand trial (CST). 
 
The Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial- Revised (ECST-R) (Rogers, 
Tillbrook & Sewell, 2004) was one of the first such measures to include 
malingering items; as opposed to the floor effect detection strategy of the 
FTP, the ECST-R uses ‘Atypical Scales’, which roughly correspond to the 
‘Magnitude of Error’ and ‘Psychological Sequelae’ detection strategies 
described in the Introduction 7 (Eastman et al., 2013). In terms of content, the 
researchers considered that some defendants may attempt to malinger 
blatantly psychotic symptoms, whereas others may malinger in a non-
psychotic manner, and thus included two scales, the Atypical Presentation- 
Psychotic (ATP-P) and Atypical Presentation-Nonpsychotic (ATP-N), with 10 
7 Magnitude of Error’ detection strategy involves examining qualitative and quantitative features of the respondent’s 
wrong answer for evidence of exaggeration or fabrication; the ‘Psychological sequelae’ strategy relates to 
malingerers faking symptoms which are inconsistent with their alleged problem (Eastman et al., 2013).  
 
85 
 
                                            
and 8 items respectively. A third scale, the ATP-Impairment (ATP-I) 
investigated the means by which respondents supposed their symptoms 
impaired their ability to stand trial; a final scale, the ATP-Realistic (ATP-R) as 
a scale of filler realistic items so as to reduce face validity of the ATP Scales 
(Rogers, Jackson, Sewell & Harrison, 2004). All of the items address 
symptoms or problems pertaining to the context of the upcoming trial, and are 
all scored on a 3-point scale (0=no, 1= sometimes/qualified yes, 2= yes). 
Investigations have found that these ATP scales show good homogeneity 
and, within a simulated malingering design, had false-negatives within the 5-
6% range and sensitivity and specificity rates both at 86% (Rogers et al., 
2004), although a later study indicated that sensitivity ranged from 66 to 78% 
(Vitacco, Rogers, & Gabel, 2009). 
 
Clearly, there is a trade-off here in terms of the time taken to administer four 
extra scales alongside the core competency to stand trial scales. By 
comparison, the Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT) (Gothard, Viglione, 
Meloy & Sherman, 1995) has added one eight-item Atypical Presentation 
Scale (APS), which was initially reported to result in specificity of 90%, but a 
sensitivity (ability to correctly identify malingerers as malingerers) of only 
around 34%; altering the cut-off scores for the scale resulted in a specificity of 
78% and a sensitivity rate of 73% (Rogers, Sewell, Grandjean & Vitaco, 
2002).  The FTP’s sensitivity rate of 14%, as suggested by the current study, 
on the basis of its four malingering items,is clearly low by comparison with 
these established measures.  
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4.2.3. Optimising malingering detection with the FTP 
 
Of course, on the other hand, the task of incorporating an exhaustive list of 
malingering items into what was intended to be a brief measure of fitness to 
plead (to be included as part of a larger clinical assessment), approaches the 
impossible. The Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) (Rogers 
et al., 1991),for example, which was discussed in the Introduction, has 
attracted considerable research attention as a dedicated measure of 
malingering of psychiatric symptoms and includes scales that measure 
“apparent honesty or likelihood of feigning in regard to rare symptoms, 
symptom combinations, improbable or absurd symptoms, blatant symptoms, 
subtle symptoms, severity of symptoms, selectivity of symptoms, and reported 
versus observed symptoms (as well as scales that measure)…direct honesty 
appraisal, defensive symptoms and symptom onset” (Drogin, 2001, p.713). It 
is, by its very nature, not brief; likewise, the Test of Malingered Memory 
(TOMM) (Tombaugh, 1996) is a well-validated test dedicated to the dedication 
of malingered cognitive deficits, and comprises some 50 items (Rogers, 
Payne, Berry & Granacher, 2009). Compared with stand-alone batteries such 
as these, FTP’s mere four malingering items are perhaps unavoidably crude. 
As mentioned previously, however, the usefulness of a standardised 
assessment is necessarily compromised if it requires additional tests of 
malingering (Grisso, 2003).  
 
Implicit in the foregoing is the assertion that malingering is necessarily a non-
unitary construct, comprising at the very least, the dimensions of malingered 
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psychopathology and malingered cognitive deficits. Within the malingering 
literature, it has been reported that a great number of clinical psychologists, 
including neuropsychologists, appear to assume that a single, higher-order 
“malingering” dimension cuts across both neurocognitive and psychometric 
measures; however, recent findings would seem to contradict this assumption 
(Lilienfeld, Thames & Watts, 2013). For example, correlations between 
measures from neuropsychology versus psychopathology tend to be poor 
(Haggerty, Frazier, Busch & Naugle, 2007; Morey, 2007), with the finding that 
individuals who malinger psychiatric symptoms do not necessarily 
underperform on cognitive measures, and that memory-oriented measures, 
such as the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT) tend not be useful for 
detecting other types of malingering (Lilienfeld, Thames & Watts, 2013).  
 
Thus, in order to ensure robust detection of malingering in its various forms in 
and of itself, the FTP would ideally include items to address each of these 
disparate dimensions, rather than solely assessing cognitive 
underperformance by means of floor effect testing. This would potentially 
make the test quite lengthy however, which could threaten its clinical 
usefulness when time-constraints are present, in the under-resourced criminal 
justice system. However, it is important to note that the qualitative content of 
respondents’ answers on the measure as a whole, specifically the bizarre 
content and quite blatant attempts at underperforming discussed previously 
must not (and would not) be overlooked as ‘warning signs warranting 
investigation’ in the clinical setting for which this measure is intended. It must 
be reiterated also that the administration of the FTP is intended to form part, 
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but not all of the clinical assessment of fitness to plead. It may be that in the 
case of the clinician noticing any warning signs during FTP administration, 
either via unusual or unexpected qualitative responses, or via incorrect 
responses on the floor effect items, additional stand-alone testing of 
malingering is required; the nature of the impairment malingered (e.g. either 
cognitive deficits or psychopathology) would determine the stand-alone 
malingering measure to be used. 
 
4.3. Research Question 3  
‘What do participants understand fitness to plead to mean?’ 
 
In addition to providing validation for the FTP with respect to malingering, this 
study also served the purpose of providing us with an insight into the lay 
understanding of FTP and a lay understanding of how unfitness can be 
malingered.  
 
Firstly, with regard to a lay understanding of fitness to plead, the results would 
appear to indicate that there is little consensus amongst the sample as to 
what fitness to plead comprises. Considering the difficulties that exist within 
and between different countries in terms of how best to assess and determine 
fitness to plead, and the ongoing debates that exist amongst professionals 
from the fields of Psychology, Psychiatry and Law, as outlined in the 
Introduction, it is perhaps unsurprising that a lay sample lacks a clear 
understanding of what exactly fitness to plead is.  
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The two most frequently endorsed themes resulting from analysis of this item 
were those of ‘Mental health problem/ disorder’ and ‘Unstable/unsound mind’. 
Within the latter, many participants offered quite vague responses, seemingly 
unable to pin down what ‘unstable’ or ‘unsound’ might constitute in practice. 
Those responding that someone with a ‘Mental health problem/ disorder’ 
might be classified as unfit provided a wide range of examples of qualifying 
conditions, such as depression, mania, schizophrenia, post-natal depression 
and anxiety. Other themes make reference to learning disabilities, memory 
difficulties, physical health problems and insanity, amongst others, as 
potential reasons why someone may be found unfit to plead.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, the test of unfitness to plead as it currently 
stands relates to whether or not the defendant is ‘under a disability’, caused 
by a physical impairment or a mental disorder (Law Commission, 2010); 
relevant here is the extent to which this disability will impact upon the 
defendant’s ability to comprehend proceedings, rather than the mere 
existence of the condition itself (Exworthy, 2006).  Several of the themes 
emerging from the current study, under this broad definition of disability, could 
reasonably be described as grounds for unfitness to plead. However, 
participants did not describe an understanding that the themes they posited 
must directly influence an individual’s ability to comprehend and engage with 
their trial. One quote stands out, from a participant who suggested that 
unfitness to plead might relate to a learning disability and an individual’s not 
being able to “understand the court process, take on advice or stand up for 
themselves”, suggesting an understanding that a judgement of unfitness 
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specifically relates to one’s inability to engage with the trial process. However, 
such references were infrequent in the data, with the majority of participants 
appearing to endorse the idea that certain conditions in and of themselves 
would render someone unfit to plead.  
  
Given the fact that formal findings of unfitness to plead under the Pritchard 
criteria are extremely rare, it is difficult to conclude specifically as to which of 
these themes feature most prominently in ‘real-life’ cases of unfitness to plead 
(Rogers, Blackwood, Farnham, Pickup & Watts, 2008). However, based on 
the few studies that have been conducted in this area, it has been noted that 
Learning Disability (a theme mentioned 7 times in the current study) tends to 
feature in about a third of unfitness to plead judgements (Mackay et al., 2007), 
and that in fact psychosis and psychotic symptoms are the most positively 
associated with findings of unfitness (Mackay et al., 2007; James et al., 2001). 
The two most endorsed themes in response to this research question were 
‘Mental health problem/ disorder’ and ‘Unstable/unsound mind’, and no 
respondents referred to the term psychosis specifically; however, there were 
10 references to schizophrenia, and while the interview did not probe the 
respondents for their understanding of what schizophrenia meant and how it 
would affect someone’s fitness to plead, it is clear that the importance of 
psychosis, specifically schizophrenia, in relation to fitness to plead is relatively 
known amongst this sample.   
 
While respondents by and large did not recognise the importance of the 
condition or impairment needing to impact on the individual’s understanding 
91 
 
and ability to engage with the trial as necessary for a finding of unfitness, 
there was some recognition of the fact that the impairment would likely need 
to be considerable so as to qualify as unfit to plead. For example, some 
participants noted someone might be found unfit if they were in “in a period of 
severe mania or depression”, “maybe (had) severe autism”; that mental illness 
would be a legitimate reason for unfitness if it was “severe depression, 
schizophrenia, something very serious” or if the mental health problem was 
“extreme, such as schizophrenia, or those that had been sectioned”. This 
aspect of lay understanding of unfitness to plead is in line with the finding 
mentioned previously that, in a sample of 479 court referrals for fitness to 
plead evaluations, 73% of those found unfit to plead failed on 3 or more of the 
Pritchard criteria, indicating that the majority of those found unfit to plead are 
likely have considerable impairment to their ability to engage with a trial 
(James et al., 2001). However, the vast majority of respondents did not 
emphasise the need for a condition to be severe, and many were quite vague 
in their references to mental ‘instability/unsoundness’; given the noted high 
threshold for unfitness to plead under the Pritchard criteria (Rogers et al., 
2009; Peay, 2009), this researcher is led to conclude that, by and large, 
respondents in the current study likely underestimated the extent of the 
impairment required for an individual to be found unfit to plead as it currently 
stands.  
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4.3.1. Responses in light of revised Fitness to Plead concept 
Considering the fact that one of the reasons behind revising the concept of 
fitness of plead concerns the broadly agreed finding that the threshold for 
unfitness is too high, it is worth reflecting on whether the respondents’ ideas 
around fitness in fact fit more closely with this newer, comparatively broader 
version of fitness.   
 
Within the revised concept, fitness to plead comprises, primarily, an 
individual’s decision-making capacity in relation to their trial. As mentioned 
above, very few participants made specific reference to the importance of an 
impairment impacting upon someone’s abilities in relation to their trial, and, 
unsurprisingly, no participants referred to an individual’s decision-making 
capacity as being central to their fitness. However, if we consider the literature 
on factors known to influence one’s decision-making capacity, it is worth 
noting that some participants did indeed refer to factors that are known to 
influence one’s decision-making capacity. As well as cognitive ability, 
depression and schizophrenia, as discussed above, some participants made 
reference to a defendant’s age, and that if they were ‘too young’ they might be 
considered unfit, as well as referencing situational factors such as the stress 
of the courtroom, noting that if you’re fit to plead, ‘you could withstand the 
stress of the trial and answer questions’, and being unfit might relate to 
someone ‘(not being able to) cope- there’d be too much stress and they 
couldn’t handle it’. While this is not a suggestion that the presence of such 
factors would be sufficient to result in a finding of unfitness to plead under the 
decision-making capacity re-formulation, it is an acknowledgement that 
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certain issues touched on here by some respondents, such as one’s ability to 
cope with stress, are known factors in impairing decision-making capacity, 
and will likely need to be considered if and when fitness to plead assessments 
come to be based on decision-making capacity criteria.   
 
While it is acknowledged that, on the whole, respondents in the current study 
have likely underestimated the impairment required to be found unfit to plead, 
key themes such as a defendant having a mental health problem, with 
schizophrenia mentioned many times, are in line with real-life findings of 
profiles of unfitness to plead; it is useful for clinicians to bear in mind that such 
lay knowledge exists, specifically as such knowledge may inform a 
defendant’s attempt to malinger within a fitness to plead assessment, as will 
now be discussed.   
 
4.4. Research question 4 
‘What ‘profiles’ of malingering do respondents instructed to malinger enact?’ 
 
The specific question asked of participants here was: “In what ways did you 
attempt to be found unfit to plead?”, or, in the case of a participant from the 
control group “…What kind of ways could you have attempted to be found 
unfit to plead?”. The theme most frequently endorsed was that of ‘feigning 
understanding difficulties’, followed by the theme of ‘didn’t know how to seem 
unfit/didn’t try’ and ‘personal characteristics’. It is worth taking a closer look at 
these themes and the specific strategies that respondents attempted so as to 
be found unfit to plead. 
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Within the theme of ‘feigning understanding difficulties’, some of the 
explanations of strategies respondents provided were that (they) ‘responded 
but not in full detail, to show less understanding’, ‘(tried to seem) stuck, 
confused, and not really getting it…maybe like a mild learning disability’ and 
‘aimed to not really understand, for you to think I was a bit “slow”’, gave ‘sort 
of incomplete answers, maybe some a bit wrong’ and ‘kept my answers short/ 
bit vague to make you think I didn’t understand’. Within the control group, 
some suggested strategies that they might have tried were as follows: 
‘I would have tried to be vague, seem like I don’t understand, given more “I 
don’t knows’; ‘I could have not given much information, just saying “no 
comment’ and ‘I could try to answer it all wrong, saying “I don’t know”’.  
 
This theme, of feigned understanding difficulties, was the outright ‘winner’ in 
terms of being the most frequently mentioned strategy by respondents for 
attempting to be found unfit to plead; despite the fact that within Research 
Question 3, a majority of respondents noted that ‘mental health problems’ or 
‘unsoundness of mind’ were the main reasons why someone would be found 
unfit to plead, feigning an understanding difficulty, and not feigning a mental 
health problem, was the most employed strategy within this sample. In fact, 
not one respondent noted that they attempted to malinger any kind of mental 
health problem.  
 
There is very little literature with which these results can be compared. One 
previous study, with a very similar design to the current study, involved a 
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simulated malingering design, with competency to stand trial measured by the 
Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT) and malingered psychopathology 
measured by the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) 
(Gothard, Viglione, Meloy & Sherman, 1995). This study is rare in that the 
respondents were, as in the current study, also asked to report, post-testing, 
on the malingering strategy they had employed. Within their sample, 20% had 
attempted to “Lie without a plan”, 13% of respondents replied that they had 
attempted to “Act confused” throughout testing, 13% had attempted to “Imitate 
a disorder”, 10% had attempted to “Imitate a person”, 10% had attempted to 
“Act crazy”, 10% had attempted to “Respond positively to unusual questions”, 
with the remainder employing a miscellaneous strategy (Gothard et al., 1995). 
It is clear from these findings that, while some 13% of participants attempted 
to act confused, which could be taken as analogous to malingered 
understanding difficulties in the current data, the majority attempted to portray 
quite a distinct psychopathological profile of impairment. Key here is the fact 
that the respondents were asked items relating to specific psychiatric 
symptoms (on the SIRS), raising the opportunity for such a profile to be 
malingered. In the current sample, however, when presented with questions 
entirely concerned with the trial process, respondents perhaps felt less able to 
malinger a profile other than poor understanding;  had the respondents been 
provided with the ‘prompts’ to report bizarre symptoms, such as within an 
inventory such as the SIRS, it is possible that those who understood fitness to 
plead to relate to mental health problems (as indicated in Research Question 
3), may have translated this into an attempt at malingering a 
psychopathological profile of unfitness.   
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Related to this is the fact that the second most endorsed theme in terms of  
attempts at being found unfit to plead, was the theme of ‘didn’t know how to  
seem unfit/didn’t try’. Participants reported that ‘it was hard- the questions 
were quite straightforward so it was hard to know how to fake them; I tried to 
answer kind of briefly to show that I didn’t know enough to say more’, ‘I just 
answered quite normally- couldn’t think of what to do, just answered normally’;  
that they ‘didn’t try anything because I wasn’t sure if I knew what it meant 
properly’ and ‘didn’t know how to convey being unfit- I thought I’d be asked to 
try it later’. From the frequency with which these theme was endorsed, one 
could conclude that participants felt there were few obvious routes by which 
they could malinger unfitness to plead on the FTP. While participants within 
the simulated malingering group did score significantly lower than those within 
the control group, the frequent occurrence of this theme suggests that this 
discrepancy could have potentially been more significant had the FTP 
presented more obvious ‘opportunities’ for the participant to simulate 
malingering. This would seem to indicate that participants found the FTP 
relatively difficult to malinger on, save for attempts at malingering 
understanding or cognitive difficulties.  
 
This is important in terms of guiding clinicians as to which profiles those 
inclined to malinger will be more likely to attempt, with the evidence here 
suggesting that the prospective malingerer may be more likely than not to 
attempt to portray understanding/cognitive difficulties. Also relevant here are 
the noted attempts at underperforming discussed previously, such as 
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individuals from the Simulated Malingerers group getting some relatively easy 
items such as ‘what is the role of the judge/jury’ quite markedly wrong; it is 
likely that clinicians will need to be alert to attempts at malingering cognitive 
difficulties on these more open-ended items, as well as the specific 
malingering items themselves.   
 
However, there is one other theme that is important to consider, which was 
endorsed third most frequently (by some 11 respondents), and this is the 
theme of ‘Personal Characteristics’. Within this theme, respondents noted that 
certain idiosyncratic behaviours they had employed in an attempt to be found 
unfit to plead, such as ‘(I) tried to be rude”,“I acted like I didn’t really care, not 
taking it seriously” or that they “tried being exaggerated and focusing on 
emotionality rather than evidence” or “(tried) to be very nervous/ worried/ 
stressed and unsure of myself”. Respondents did not make links as to why 
they believed that these behaviours might be associated with being found 
unfit to plead, but a sizable minority of respondents took this approach 
nonetheless. Clinicians should be alert to the possibility that the defendant 
may be adopting an idiosyncratic approach to malingering, which may or may 
not be detected by the FTP malingering items but which may nonetheless 
manifest itself in an impaired score. Generally speaking, however, given the 
fact that defendants have been judged “highly abnormal” or suffering from a 
“high degree of mental abnormality, including being delusional” without being 
found unfit under English/ Welsh law (Rogers et al., 2008), it is likely the case 
that, within the current sample, respondents’ attempts at malingering would 
simply not meet the threshold for unfitness to plead.  
98 
 
 4.4.1. Responses in light of the revised Fitness to Plead concept 
Under the revised Fitness to Plead concept, decision-making capacity will be 
assessed; specifically, the defendant’s ability to understand, retain, use and 
weigh, and communicate information relating to their decisions.  
As can be seen here, the primary malingering strategy employed by 
respondents was that of malingering ‘understanding difficulties’. Within this 
theme, there was much reference to deliberately trying to be seen to not 
understand information, or of providing limited answers in response to probing 
questions. Faced with a defendant employing this approach, the clinician 
would likely be unclear as to whether the individual fully understands the 
information at hand, as well as whether or not the individual is capable of 
retaining, weighing up and communicating their decisions if they are providing 
limited or incomplete answers. Naturally, providing less information resulted in 
a lower score on the FTP in this study. Whereas under the Pritchard criteria, 
less is expected of the defendant in order to be found fit, the FTP, with its 
explicit focus on the decision-making capacity of the individual, expects  the 
defendant to be able to demonstrate all elements of decision-making capacity. 
While there are no cut-off scores associated with the FTP, it could still be 
speculated that were a defendant to employ this malingering strategy, and 
repeatedly provide limited or incomplete information in response to items on 
the FTP, their low score would likely lead the clinician to question their ability 
to make decisions at the level required by a trial. It is tentatively suggested 
therefore that, while noted above, underperforming at this level would be 
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unlikely to reach the threshold for unfitness under Pritchard criteria, under this 
new and lower threshold for unfitness, there is likely a higher risk of 
malingered understanding difficulties resulting in a clinician returning a finding 
of unfitness to plead. However, it is not suggested that clinicians would make 
this finding on the basis of FTP results alone, and is merely offered here as a 
warning that extra caution be taken, and additional attempts at establishing 
decision-making capacity be undertaken where indicated.   
 
Finally, in relation to the theme of ‘Personal Characteristics’ and specifically 
the references to unusual attitudes, exaggeration and emotionality offered by 
some participants: while these characteristics mentioned were not described 
by participants as intending to convey a Personality Disorder specifically, 
there is some overlap between such characteristics and symptoms of different 
Personality Disorders. It is worth noting that one study has noted the 
difficulties involved in assessing decision-making capacity amongst 
individuals with a Personality Disorder, specifically when the respondent was 
in a state of high arousal or impulsivity (Szmukler, 2009). Whether such 
symptoms are malingered or otherwise, it is important to reiterate the 
principles of detailed clinical assessment, potentially carried out over multiple 
sessions in order to obtain an accurate measure of decision-making capacity, 
and by extension, fitness to plead.    
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4.5. Exploration of study characteristics 
4.5.1: RSPM: A suitable criterion measure? 
 
As explored in the Introduction, Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
(RSPM) is an example of a neuropsychological test that relies on the 
performance curve and the fact that malingerers may not always consider 
item difficulty when deciding which answers to fail; i.e. often performing poorly 
on easy items, but approaching chance when it comes to difficult items where 
they do not know the right answer and thus might inadvertently choose it 
(Conroy & Kwartner, 2006).  
 
As with many simulated malingering studies in the literature, it is a non-verbal 
neuropsychological test. Whereas the TOMM and other tests such as the Rey 
15-item test (See Chapter 1) may have good validity, they rely on the floor 
effect, or participants failing very easy items; this type of detection strategy 
can unfortunately be quite transparent to participants. Performance curve 
detection, on the other hand, should be less easily identified (Bender & 
Rogers, 2004). 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the RSPM has performed reasonably well across 
validation studies, with a specificity of 74% and false positive rate of 5% in a 
large sample validation (McKinzey et al., 1999), and similar rates in a 
community sample (Andrade, Tharakan & Chari, 2001) (both studies using the 
rate of decay formula) and is relatively quick and easy to administer.  
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However, using this same formula in the current study, only 12.5% of the 
Simulated Malingerers group were identified as Malingering on the RSPM. It 
is crucial here to refer back to the finding that Simulated Malingerers’ Overall 
scores on the RSPM  were significantly lower than those from the Control 
group, suggestive of attempts at malingering. However, using the rate of 
decay formula did not result in correct classification of Simulated Malingerers 
in this study.  
 
This finding is not unprecedented, as another study similarly found significant 
differences between malingering and control groups’ overall scores, but not 
between their rate of decay scores (Andrade et al., 2001). Perhaps relevant 
here are some of the qualitative findings obtained, which referred to 
participants attempting to get patterns wrong, but crucially ‘not the really 
obvious ones’.  The study conducted by Andrade and colleagues, similar to 
the current study, was explicit in encouraging judicious malingering (so as not 
to be detected), compared with previous studies which did not make such 
specifications. With such instructions, participants may have been more wary 
of underperforming ‘randomly’, which may explain the lack of performance 
curve deviations. Although the current study was not directly concerned with 
exploring the effectiveness of the RSPM, these findings provide some 
tentative indications that the rate of decay formula may not have been an 
effective means of identifying malingering amongst a sample instructed to 
malinger judiciously. 
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What this means for the current study is that, had we used a criterion 
measure that was more effective at picking up judicious malingering, this 
alternative measure would, one assumes, have identified more malingerers; in 
this case, the disparity between the number of malingerers identified by the 
FTP and the number identified by the criterion measure would have been 
even greater, resulting in even worse sensitivity scores for the FTP.  
 
4.5.2. Using an undergraduate sample 
 
In choosing the sample for this study, several factors were considered before  
deciding upon using an undergraduate sample. Firstly, the literature was 
consulted and it emerged that while, for the most part, undergraduates are 
maligned as an unrepresentative sample of convenience, when it comes to 
studying simulated malingering, they may in fact be a particularly appropriate 
sample choice. Indeed it has been demonstrated that student malingerers are 
in fact more sophisticated in their attempts at malingering than are other 
simulated malingerers recruited from a clinical setting, such that a student 
sample is a particularly stringent group upon which to validate a test of 
malingering (Haines & Norris, 2001).  
 
In exploring a test of fitness to plead, the most ecologically valid group that 
this measure can be tested on is likely to be actual criminal defendants; 
Brown and her colleagues are in fact in the process of carrying out this very 
research with the FTP, using a sample of defendants recruited through the 
Crown Court (P. Brown, personal communication, September 2015). 
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However, it would obviously be ethically questionable to require this same 
group to try to deliberately be found unfit (i.e. to malinger). Rather, using a 
sample of supposedly ‘sophisticated’ malingerers for such a study could be 
defended as the most suitable option in this case, where the focus is solely on 
the detection of malingering.   
 
Furthermore, as this study required approximately 70 minutes of the 
participant’s time, and a moderate sample size, availing of the existing student 
research participation scheme minimised recruitment time (which would likely 
have been otherwise very challenging considering the time commitment 
required of participants) and maximised the time available to actually conduct 
the testing.  
 
However, having conducted the research, it is clear that there were some 
unanticipated disadvantages to using an undergraduate sample. One of these 
relates to the fact that, being first-year undergraduates, the vast majority of 
the sample was either 19 years of age or younger; it is noted that, for many 
young adults, at this transitional stage, anxiety, particularly social anxiety, is 
very common. One study indicated that as many as 33% of undergraduates 
reported symptoms of social anxiety and that this was especially heightened 
during the transition to University (Strahan, 2003). One of the key components 
of social anxiety is the fear of negative evaluation from embarrassing oneself 
(Campbell, Bierman & Molenaar, 2016). While conducting this study, this 
researcher observed that many participants seemed quite nervous and 
concerned with ‘getting it right’. The qualitative finding that many of the group 
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instructed to malinger ‘did not know what to do/ didn’t try’ may be relevant 
here. Of course it is possible that many of the group did not know what to try; 
however, it is also possible that the embarrassment or fear of getting it wrong 
meant that fewer participants attempted to simulate malingering than would 
have been optimal.   
 
Related to this is the fact that the research participation scheme prohibited the 
use of incentives for ‘successful malingering’. It is similarly possible that, 
applying a cost-benefit analysis, many participants were insufficiently 
motivated to risk incurring embarrassment, meaning that fewer attempts were 
made at malingering than may have been the case were there an incentive to 
do so.  
 
4.5.3. Study instructions 
 
Finally, it is also noted that, although fine-tuned at pilot stage, there appeared 
to have been some difficulties with some participants misunderstanding the 
instructions set B, that is, the instructions to malinger.  The set-up was indeed 
initially confusing, as it required participants to imagine that they (themselves) 
were charged with a crime and that the study they were participating in was 
an assessment of their readiness for trial. Within the video assessment, they 
were then required to step into the shoes of someone else (i.e. Sam Taylor) 
for the purpose of walking through a trial process; however, some participants 
lost sight of the fact that they were playing a defendant undergoing 
assessment for trial and instead believed that Sam’s trial was “their” trial. On 
105 
 
this basis, some participants decided that as Sam’s case was going quite well, 
they no longer needed to ‘seem unfit’ as they (Sam) would be found innocent. 
This is a step beyond what would be expected of a criminal defendant 
undergoing this assessment, as in the real-world, respondents would be 
asked merely to step into Sam’s shoes, whereas in the current study, 
participants were asked to imagine firstly that they had been charged with a 
crime and were been assessed for their suitability for trial, and then to imagine 
that, within that assessment, they were being asked to step into Sam’s shoes. 
It is accepted that this was a complex conceit, to expect participants to hold 
this “meta” idea in mind. It is heartening that so many of the participants paid 
close attention to the instructions and made attempts to malinger, as 
evidenced by their answering of the follow-up questions. However, the fact 
remains that a sizable minority appeared to have misunderstood the 
complicated instructions, further reducing the valid sample size.  
 
4.6. The future of the FTP 
4.6.1. Decision-making capacity, as assessed by the FTP  
It is worth reiterating that when assessing an individual’s ability to make 
decisions, the clinician must determine their ability to understand, retain, use 
and weigh, and communicate information relating to their decision (Mental 
Capacity Act, 2005).  
 
Within the FTP (Appendix 5), items are included to probe the defendant’s 
knowledge of the court process and court personnel, and their ability to retain 
information is assessed by means of questions about what they have 
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remembered from the film vignettes. The FTP also requires the individual to 
weigh up the advantages and disadvantages related to different decisions 
required in court, especially decisions around pleading guilty or not guilty, and 
giving evidence or not, as well as being asked to consider the consequences 
of being found guilty or not guilty. While this study was not an evaluation of 
the FTP generally nor of how well it measures decision-making capacity, 
preliminary results from the researchers indicate that the FTP has a two-factor 
structure, tapping into ‘foundational abilities’ and, crucially, ‘decision-making 
abilities (P. Brown, personal communication, 20th May, 2016). While no further 
information is available at present regarding the foundational abilities factor, it 
is reassuring that the FTP is tapping into decision-making abilities specifically, 
considering that this was the remit for a new measure of fitness to plead set 
out by the Law Commission.  
  
4.6.2. Optimising decision-making capacity at fitness to plead 
assessment 
 
The experience of engaging in assessment in relation to their fitness to plead, 
involving considering different pleading options and whether or not to give 
evidence, amongst other decisions, is likely to be non-routine for many 
defendants, as well as a stressful situation. As was explored in the 
Introduction, we know that stress and non-routine situations can impede 
effective decision-making, and also, that special measures specifically aimed 
at making the court process less intimidating and stressful and at assisting the 
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vulnerable individual with understanding and communicating as best they can, 
already exist (Talbot, 2012).  
 
To this end, it is suggested that the routine inclusion of extra supports at the 
point of fitness to plead assessment may enable vulnerable defendants to 
maximise their decision-making capacity at this stage, and prevent against 
vulnerable but not unfit defendants being found unfit to plead. To reiterate, 
such extra supports may include providing extra time, visual communication 
aids, shorter questions and testing times, and an intermediary being used 
(Gerry, 2012); it has indeed been suggested by the Law Commission that 
such special measures should in future be incorporated into the point of 
fitness to plead assessment as indicated, as well as throughout trial for those 
vulnerable defendants found fit to plead (Law Commission, 2010; Howard, 
2011).  
 
It is suggested here that, as well as optimising decision-making capacity for 
vulnerable defendants, the routine inclusion of extra supports could also be 
regarded as an additional safeguard against malingering; future research 
focusing on vulnerable respondents likely to perform quite poorly on the FTP 
being provided with extra supports could establish an accurate baseline score 
for this population, such that a score below this level achieved ‘with supports’ 
may be indicative of malingering. This new malingering ‘cut-off’ score could be 
applied with some confidence as clinicians would be reassured that it is based 
on the range of scores achieved by vulnerable defendants on the FTP under 
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optimal conditions, such that a score beneath this cut-off can be said to truly 
reflect underperformance, rather than unfitness.  
  
4.6.3. Will the FTP be adopted by clinicians? 
 
As we have seen, there has been one previous measure of fitness to plead 
developed for use in the U.K., namely the MacCAT-FP, which appears to be 
infrequently used in clinical practice or research (Akinkunmi, 2002; Brewer, 
2013). This inevitably raises the question of whether or not the FTP will be 
met with the same fate. Certainly, a considerable number of psychiatrists 
have expressed their continued concerns around adopting a standardised 
measure (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2011). However, it is important to 
note that primary amongst the concerns noted by psychiatrists in regards to a 
new test of fitness to plead was the fact that there would be no baseline 
against which such a defendant’s score could be compared. It is suggested 
here that the validation studies that continue to be undertaken by the FTP’s 
authors, as well as this current study, will go some way towards establishing 
an initial baseline. Regardless or not of whether there is a baseline, the 
administering of such a test could be viewed as an efficient means of 
establishing areas of difficulty for the defendant, which can be probed further 
during the clinical interview; it cannot be overstated that the FTP is not 
intended to replace clinical assessment, but rather to form a strand of it which 
can begin to help standardise fitness to plead assessment.   
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Relevant here is the fact that the Law Commission have recently revised their 
stance regarding the medical expertise requirement for experts conducting 
fitness to plead assessments, such that psychologists should be included 
amongst this group of experts (Law Commission, 2016). It is worth noting that 
psychologists’ training will typically involve the critical evaluation and 
administration of standardised testing (with this assessment aspect of training 
increasing in recent years) (Ready & Veague, 2014; Krishnamurthy,  
VandeCreek, Kaslow, Tazeau, Miville, Kerns, Suzuki & Benton, 2004)  and 
that a great number of psychologists working in the clinical and forensic fields 
will also have considerable experience in testing for malingering as part of a 
formal battery of assessments. Perhaps if psychologists are more central in 
conducting these assessments in future, the FTP will be more likely to be 
routinely adopted.  
 
However, in the U.S.A., where fitness assessments are typically carried out by 
forensic psychologists, one study has revealed that when asked about the 
specific measures they use to assess fitness or competence to stand trial 
(CST), forensic psychologists mentioned the Weschler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-III (WAIS-III) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 
(MMPI-2) more often than any specific CST instruments; furthermore, only 
one CST instrument was mentioned, the MacCAT-CA (Lally, 2003). 
Psychologists continuing to use intelligence or personality measures in order 
to assess CST, rather than standardised measures developed specifically for 
that purpose, is something which is quite concerning, considering the 
rationale for the use of standardised testing being to establish transparency 
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and consistency across competence and fitness assessments (Chantler & 
Heseltine, 2007) and the potentially increased confidence of the courts in the 
results of an evaluation involving the use of a specifically-developed 
standardised fitness measure (Akinkunmi, 2002).  
 
It is unclear whether the new FTP will be passed over by many, in favour of 
long established and familiar psychometric tools, as suggested by the 
situation in the U.S.A.; it is likely that in order for the FTP to be routinely 
adopted, considerably more research will be required in order to boost the 
confidence clinicians would have in using it.    
 
4.7. Conclusions 
4.7.1.Summary of study’s strengths and limitations 
 
It is noted that one of the strengths of the current study is that it managed to 
recruit a moderate sample size, and quite narrowly missed out on achieving 
the sample size required for sufficient power (recruiting 64 participants, with 
an aim of recruiting 70).    
 
In adopting a mixed-methods approach, this study improved on the majority of 
previous simulated malingering designs, exploring not only the detection of 
malingering, but the method and motivations behind the respondents’ 
attempts at malingering. This has meant that we have been able to explore 
some of the thinking behind individuals’ approaches to malingering, and 
specifically, to malingering fitness to plead; providing this context should 
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enhance both the clinical and theoretical applicability of these findings. 
Furthermore, by anchoring the discussion in light of the decision-making 
capacity implications, the findings are directly applicable to the Law 
Commission’s revised concept of fitness to plead.   
 
In terms of limitations, the difficulties in identifying an alternative suitable 
sample group notwithstanding, it is acknowledged that the use of 
undergraduates limits the overall generalisability of the results to another 
population. It is noted, for example, that suspected malingerers in real-life 
settings tend to have had lower levels of education and to possibly be in the 
low average range of intelligence (Haines & Norris, 2001), evidently dissimilar 
to a typical undergraduate population. 
  
It is unclear, however, whether the use of a simulation design can be wholly 
described as a limitation in this study. Certainly, while simulation designs are 
the prevalent design technique within the malingering literature, many have 
argued against such designs due to the threats to external validity inherent in 
non-organic malingering; furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the 
presence of incentives, either positive or negative, plays a key role in 
determining the quality and quantity of malingered symptoms (Rogers & 
Cruise, 1998). However, it has also since been demonstrated that student 
malingerers perform similarly to suspected ‘real-life’ malingerers, suggesting 
that the use of simulated designs may be justified (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006).  
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As mentioned above, it is also acknowledged that within this study, it was not 
possible to incentivise students to succeed in their attempts at malingering, 
which may have yielded more realistic results.  
 
Furthermore, it was not possible to approximate the stress and threat that 
would likely accompany a ‘real-life’ assessment of fitness to plead, and this is 
in line with Rogers observation that one of the most limiting aspects of 
simulation designs remains the inability to approximate the serious 
consequences associated with unsuccessful malingering (Rogers & Cruise, 
1998).  
 
Finally, it was identified following the completion of the testing phase that 
there had been some minor discrepancies between the exact wording of the 
instructions given to the two groups. Under ideal experimental testing 
conditions, the only difference in instructions would have been the specific 
directions given to each group, i.e. to malinger or to perform to the best of 
your ability; all other description of the task should have been identical. It is 
regrettable that these discrepancies were overlooked and not addressed at an 
earlier stage. Following the pilot phase, it was clear that, for the simulated 
malingerers group, it was particularly important that participants understood 
that they were watching someone else’s trial as, otherwise, they may ‘pretend’ 
to be Sam while answering the FTP. For this reason, this reminder that they 
were watching someone else’s trial was included in the simulated malingerers 
group’s instructions, but unfortunately not in the instructions for the control 
group. It is not thought that this will have influenced the outcome, as the 
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control group did not have anything to try to convey to the researcher, and 
answering as if they were Sam had no impact on their score on the FTP. 
Regardless, the researcher acknowledges that this oversight was unfortunate 
and one that was avoidable.  
 
4.8  Recommendations for administering the FTP and improving 
malingering detection with use of the FTP 
 
The following recommendations are offered on the basis of literature review 
and the current study’s findings, the constraints of the study’s sample and 
limitations notwithstanding.  
 
Firstly, it is suggested that, ideally, the FTP would be updated to include a 
more comprehensive malingering detection strategy; as discussed previously, 
this is not without precedent, as both the ECST-R and the GCCT in the U.S.A. 
have been revised with specific malingering scales, resulting in impressive 
sensitivity and specificity rates. As it currently stands, the FTP’s four 
malingering items are insufficient as a stand-alone scale of malingering, 
necessitating further testing of malingering on the part of the clinician. 
Furthermore, the current items test only for malingered cognitive impairment; 
it is suggested that additional malingering scale(s) should also include items 
designed to measure malingered psychopathology. Within the current study, it 
was clear that many participants were familiar with the concept of 
psychopathology being a likely reason that one would be found unfit to plead. 
It is possible that some respondents, with such information in mind, might 
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attempt to underperform in an idiosyncratic way on the FTP, which, were a 
psychopathology malingering scale to be included, may be more likely to be 
detected.  
 
However, so as not to delay the launch of the FTP, it is suggested that the   
clinician can take certain steps to optimise malingering detection on the FTP 
as it currently stands. As mentioned previously, the clinician should 
endeavour to be alert to attempts at malingering throughout (and not just on 
the specific items), as apparent attempts at underperforming on open-ended 
items were observed in this study, and could be further probed as part of the 
clinical assessment. On the basis of the current results, it is suggested that 
clinicians be particularly alert to attempts at malingering cognitive impairment, 
as this was the primary method by which participants noted they had 
attempted to be found unfit to plead.  
 
As mentioned previously, it is suggested that the clinician carry out an 
additional malingering assessment as part of the clinical assessment of 
fitness to plead, if it is suspected that the defendant is underperforming; one 
study indicates that the two most commonly used stand-alone measures of 
malingering are the Rey 15-item test and the Test of Malingered Memory 
(TOMM) (Slick, Tan, Strauss & Hultsch, 2004). The clinician may be guided 
by the profile of malingering the defendant appears to be attempting and 
choose the measure accordingly.  
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It is also advised that the clinician be conversant with the various factors that 
may influence an individual’s decision-making capacity, such as the impact 
depression may have on their temporal abilities, and the effect of age and 
stress, so as to ensure that such aspects are factored in to a clinical 
assessment of reformulated fitness to plead.  
 
Finally, as was discussed in the Introduction, there is a need to balance 
protecting those who are ‘truly’ unfit to plead from standing trial and the 
consequences that that entails, with ensuring that those defendants who 
could be facilitated to engage with their trial if the right supports are in place, 
are not unjustly excluded from doing so. It is therefore reiterated that 
appropriate extra supports (such as visual communication aids, use of 
advocates, intermediaries etc) be provided at the point of fitness to plead 
assessment, such that the clinician can make as fully informed a judgement 
as possible regarding the individual’s decision-making capacity and thus their 
fitness to plead.  
  
 
4.9. Implications  
4.9.1. Implications in terms of the literature around FTP and 
malingering 
 
This study has demonstrated that while, on the whole, respondents likely 
underestimated the level of impairment required to be found unfit to plead, 
key themes such as a defendant having a mental health problem (with 
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schizophrenia mentioned many times) are in line with real-life findings of 
unfitness to plead. There have been no other comparable studies conducted 
in the U.K. that the author is aware of, and therefore the current study 
constitutes a baseline of lay knowledge regarding fitness to plead; only 
future research will reveal if this knowledge develops over time, or when the 
re-formulated concept of fitness to plead is implemented.  
 
The current study indicated that, as well as the varied ideas that exist around 
what fitness to plead constitutes, so too did the sample’s approaches to 
malingering. Again, there are have been no other such studies in the U.K. 
against which these findings can be compared, but it is offered that the lay 
sample’s clear preference for malingering cognitive/understanding difficulties 
indicates the readiness with which this route of malingering was called to 
mind. Idiosyncratic suggestions of the sample relating to personal or 
personality characteristics are also noted and may form an important part of 
this baseline understanding of how a lay population may malinger unfitness 
to plead. The distinction between participants suggesting cognitive 
impairment versus something more akin to a Personality Disorder may be 
taken as tentative further support for the division of malingering along 
disparate profiles, in line with much of the recent literature, rather than an 
overarching malingering domain.  
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4.9.2. Implications in terms of clinical practice 
This study has clinical implications in terms of providing further validation for 
this measure, which has yet to be launched; the Law Commission is awaiting 
findings from the validation of the FTP, with the current study one strand in 
this ongoing process.  
 
The FTP appears to be an ecologically valid and engaging measure, and 
while the current study flagged up room for improvement with regard to its 
ability to detect malingering attempts, it is of course very promising that such 
a tool is undergoing comprehensive validation; it is hoped that this process 
will yield a robust measure that clinicians will have confidence in using and 
that, crucially, widespread use can bring some consistency and a common 
frame of reference to fitness to plead assessments.  
 
The study has provided an in-depth exploration of malingering which has 
often been neglected within the fitness to plead literature. It is hoped that this 
exploration and its dissemination will highlight the importance of malingering 
detection in such assessments, so as to ensure that, under a lower threshold 
of unfitness to plead, the finding of unfitness to plead (and the serious 
consequences that this entails) will not be misapplied.   
Finally, in terms of this study’s implications for the field of clinical psychology, 
the reader is reminded that, as of this January, the Law Commission has 
revised its stance such that clinical psychologists should be granted status to 
‘officially’ provide expert evidence alongside psychiatrists regarding a 
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defendant’s fitness to plead. Considering the specialist training that clinical 
psychologists have in the use of standardised measures, as well as in the 
assessment of effort and malingering, it is suggested that this group is 
particularly well-suited to spearheading the introduction of a validated 
measure to improve the quality and consistency of assessments of fitness to 
plead; improvements which, so many agree, are desperately needed.  
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(Reviewers’ original comments are included here for your 
information): 
 
Revision required. In your revision, please provide the 
information requested by the reviewers below, which they 
require in order to fully evaluate the proposal:  
There is no information about participant "recruitment". What 
does "within RHUL" mean? Students? Faculty? 
Advertisement? How will participants be compensated for 
participation? 
Please describe the video in detail. This is the one point 
where participants can be distressed. I've personally seen 
participants become distressed by videos of crime scenes, 
even when seem innocent to the researcher so this should 
not be overlooked. But no detail is given in the application. I 
had to Google ABH to discover it involved descriptions of 
violent acts, since this abbreviation was not defined in the 
application. Where did the video come from? Is it actors? Or 
real? Do participants accept this as real? The attached 
documents tells the participant to imagine they are in the 
video but they obviously are not. I think the contents of the 
video should be described so it is clear exactly what the task 
is. 
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Appendix 2:  Participant Debriefing Sheet 
 
                Department of Psychology 
                Royal Holloway, University of London 
                Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
                 www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
                               +44 (0) 1784 443526  
                               PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
           Debriefing 
 
Thank you for taking part in my research, it is very much appreciated.  
You may have received instructions which asked you to try to deliberately be 
found unfit to stand trial. The reason for this is that my research was also 
trying to look at whether the questionnaire about the court process would 
detect an individual’s attempt to respond in a misleading way.  
For those of you who received instructions to perform to the best of your 
ability, the reason for this was so that we would have control data against 
which to compare the results of the other group who were intentionally 
misleading the researcher.  
If you have been affected by the tasks you’ve been asked to complete today, 
please do not hesitate to contact myself, in confidence. Alternatively, you may 
wish to access support from the Student Counselling Service, who can be 
contacted on 01784 443128 
If you have any questions about this research or would like to discuss your 
experience of it further, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me at 
Maeve.Wallace.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
Maeve Wallace 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist  
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Appendix 3: Participant Instructions 
Instructions A: Control Group 
 
• I would like you to imagine that you have been charged with committing 
an un-named crime. You are meeting with your allocated psychologist 
who will carry out some tests, which will consist of a video task and 
some visual recognition tasks;  
 
• In the video task, you will be watching SOMEONE ELSE’s FICTIONAL 
TRIAL. This video task will explore your understanding of trials.  
 
• Please answer all questions/ complete all tasks to the best of your 
ability. 
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 Appendix 3 (Continued) 
Instructions B: Simulated Malingerers Group  
• I would like you to imagine that you have been charged with committing 
an un-named crime. You are meeting with your allocated psychologist 
who will carry out some tests, which will consist of a video task and 
some visual recognition tasks;  
 
• In the video task, you will be watching SOMEONE ELSE’s FICTIONAL 
TRIAL. This video task will explore your understanding of trials.  
 
PLEASE NOTE:  I would like for you to imagine that you are very keen to 
avoid having to stand trial for your own crime. You have therefore decided 
that you want to be found to be UNFIT to stand trial. Throughout your meeting 
with your psychologist, when answering video questions/ visual tasks, you 
must try your hardest to be found UNFIT to stand trial. 
HOWEVER: please also remember that you should not be so obvious that the 
examiner picks up on your attempts to perform below your abilities. If you are 
detected, you WILL have to stand trial.” 
Please read these instructions again to be sure you have understood.  
Take some time to prepare how you will be found ‘unfit’ to stand trial.  
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Appendix 4:  Study advertisement  
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
                   Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
                   www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
+44 (0) 1784 443526 
PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
****Participants needed! Win a £25 Amazon voucher**** 
 
     Have you ever wondered about what goes on in a 
courtroom..?  
My name is Maeve Wallace and I’m a Doctorate student in the Department of 
Clinical Psychology.  
 
I’m looking for participants to watch a video about a fictional trial and answer 
some questions about what they understand about the trial process. There will 
also be a brief test of reasoning using patterns.  
 
The study takes approximately 1 hour/1 hour 10mins. Participants will be 
entitled to 3 research credits for their participation; if participants are not 
eligible for the research credit scheme, they will be entered into a draw to win 
one of the Amazon vouchers worth £25 each! 
 
If you are interested, please contact me at Maeve.Wallace.2013@rhul.ac.uk 
or sign up via the online RHUL research portal at https://psychology-
rhul.sona-systems.com/ 
 
The study takes place in the Bowyer Building.  
            
           Thank you in advance for your participation,  
 
 
 Maeve Wallace 
           Trainee Clinical Psychologist  
  
Supervised by: 
 Dr. Simone Fox and Dr. Emily Glorney 
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Appendix 5: FTP tool 
 
FTP- TOOL  
OVERALL TEST INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
TEST ‘SCENE SETTING’ 
• Photograph presented to subject: David Mullen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1st 2nd 3rd Scoring Criteria 
Are you being asked to imagine that you are a 
defendant facing a charge? 
   Yes or variant required 
What is your name in this task?    Sam (Taylor) is required 
What have you been charged with?    Wounding is required 
You will watch a film about your attendance at 
Court. What will I then get you to do? 
   
Answer questions or 
variant is required 
Instructions to subject: I am going to ask you to imagine that you are a 
DEFENDANT (the person accused of a crime) called Sam Taylor. Imagine that 
you, Sam Taylor, have been charged with an offence of unlawful wounding.  
 
I will ask you to watch a film which shows what happened when you attended 
Crown Court for your trial. The film will begin with two meetings with your 
defence barrister outside the courtroom. You will then watch a witness, (the 
person who you are accused of wounding) in the case giving evidence in the 
courtroom.   
 
                 
I’m now going to ask you some questions to check you understanding of those test 
instructions:  
• If incorrect response given, provide correct answer and repeat 4 questions again. 
• Repeat questions 1-4 until satisfactory answers [without prompts] are provided.  
• After 3 attempts, if subject has failed to obtain a total score of 4 testing should be terminated. 
Instructions to subject: This is David Mullen. He is the bouncer at the Royal 
Oak pub. David Mullen has accused you of hitting him during a night out. 
I will now give you a few details about the charge against you. In March you were 
in a pub with two friends (celebrating your friend’s birthday). It is alleged that an 
argument took place with a bouncer and you hit the bouncer. 
You are now going to view a meeting with your solicitor and defence barrister. Here 
the charges being brought against you will be explained. 
Please listen carefully as I will be asking you about what was discussed. Is that 
clear? 137 
 
 
Scenes 1 & 2 played – 3 minutes 
Q1. SECTION 1: First Attempt. Subject’s free recall is recorded verbatim  
...………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………….. 
                                                                                                                6 
 
 
 
PICTURE IS NOW TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT  
  
 
 
Instructions to subject: Right, so the key points in that scene: 
1. the bouncer came over and asked you to leave the pub at 1 a.m.  
2. The bouncer had a bottle in his hand.  
3. Your friend, Alex, hit the bouncer.  
4. You grabbed Alex and tried to intervene 
5.  You were hit on the side of your face with a bottle.  
6. You were wearing a yellow top. 
  
Emphasise the points the subject missed. 
 
Instructions to subject: Based on the information given by your defence 
barrister, please tell me as much as you can remember of what happened IN THE 
PUB that night? When recall is finished prompt subject with “Is that everything?” 
Q2. What do you understand about the charge against you? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
3
 
 
Q3. If you were pleading ‘not guilty’ what does this mean? *if participant does not give 
say “prosecution will have to prove it or there will be a trial, prompt with  “if you were pleading not guilty what might this 
mean for your case?” / “why might you choose to plead not guilty?” 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………… 2  
Q4. If you were pleading ‘guilty’ what does this mean? *if participant does not say either 
there will be a trial or more lenient sentence,  prompt with “if you were pleading guilty what might this mean for your case?” / 
“why might you choose to plead guilty?.............. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 4.  
Q5. What does evidence mean? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………   2  
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UNDERSTANDING ROLES OF COURT PERSONNEL AND THEIR OWN ROLE 
Scene 3 played 
Photograph presented to subject: courtroom scene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q11. What is the role of the JURY? * ”What else do the jury do?” 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………2  
Q10. What is the role of the PROSECUTING BARRISTER? *. ”What else does the prosecuting 
barrister do?” 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2: 
Q6. What is the role of the JUDGE in court? *”What else does the judge do?” 
...............................................................................................................................
................. 2  
Q7. What is the role of the DEFENCE BARRISTER? *”What else does the defence barrister do?” 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………….2     
Q8. Please rate your agreement with this statement: “A defence barrister 
should always act in their client’s best interests.” 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
Q9. Please rate your agreement with this statement: “A defence barrister 
should always follow their client’s instructions.” 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
 
              
   
 
      
 
 
 
Q9. Please rate your agreement with this statement: “A defence barrister 
should always follow their client’s instructions.” 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Q10. What is the role of the PROSECUTING BARRISTER? *. ”What else does the 
prosecuting barrister do?” 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions to subject: Okay, the next part of the film is where you are in the 
dock looking around the courtroom at the start of the trial. You will be shown all the 
people in the courtroom. Please watch carefully.  I will then ask you some questions 
about the roles of the people in the courtroom.  Is this clear? 
 
Clarify points of misunderstanding before continuing. 
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Q10. W 
 
 
 
 
hat is the role of the PROSECUTING BARRISTER? *. ”What else does the prosecuting barrister do?” 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………2  
PICTURE IS NOW TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT 
[D] ABILITY TO FOLLOW AND COMPREHEND PROCEEDINGS 
Scene 4 & 5 played – 3 mins 
 
 
Instructions to subject: Your trial will now start. You will see the prosecuting 
barrister talking to the jury at the beginning of your trial. He will then begin to 
question the bouncer, David Mullen.  I want you to watch and listen carefully to the 
proceedings and as before I will ask you some questions along the way. Is this ok? 
Clarify points of misunderstanding before continuing. 
Q11. What is the role of the JURY? * ”What else do the jury do?” 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………2.  
Q12. What would you, as a DEFENDANT, need to do in court? * ”What else might the defendant 
do?” 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………….3 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3: 
Can you please tell me what the new piece of evidence was? Administer but do not 
score. 
Q13. What does this mean for your case?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………     2 
M1. Had DM mentioned before that the person that attacked him was 
holding something? Malingering item. Score separately.   Y      N       
  1 
Q14. Did DM raise an issue about the group of 3 or 4 people? 
* if so, what? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………2 
 
 
 
 
            
                    
               
    
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
Instructions to subject: Right, now the trial is going to continue. You will 
firstly see the prosecuting barrister continuing to examine David Mullen. After that 
David Mullen will be questioned (cross-examined) by your defence barrister and the 
barristers will then talk to the Judge without the jury present.  
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Instructions to subject: It is now nearing the end of your trial. It is currently on a 
break. During this break your defence barrister will discuss with you how your trial is 
going. You will then return to the courtroom and the Judge will address your defence 
barrister.  
 
 
 
 
 
Scene 9 & 10 played. 2mins 30 seconds 
 
 
Q16. What are the advantages of giving evidence?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………..2  
Q17. What are the disadvantages f giving evidence? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
 2……………….. 
 
 
 
SECTION 4: 
M2. Did DM say someone hit him? Malingering item. Score separately. 
 * if yes, ask where? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………     1  
 
M3. Was DM injured? Malingering item. Score separately. 
Y      N         1 
M4. Did DM say that he managed to strike the person or not?  Malingering item. Score 
separately.  
Y      N         1 
Q15. When DM said that he left the pub, what did he say happened? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………1  
 
 
   
   
 
 
142 
 
 Q18. Please rate how well you think your case is progressing:  
Very Badly Badly Neither Bad/Well Well Very Well 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Q19. Why do you think that?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…….1  
Q20. Please rate how fairly you think you are being treated in this case: 
Very Unfairly Unfairly Neither Fairly/Unfairly Fairly Very Fairly 
0 1 2 3 4 
Q21. Why do you think that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………..2  
Q22. Please rate how likely it is that you will be found Guilty: 
Very Likely Likely Neither Likely/Unlikely Unlikely Very Unlikely 
0 1 2 3 4 
Q23. Why do you think that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………  2.  
Q24. If you were found guilty, how much do you think it will affect your life? 
Somewhat Quite a lot Badly Devastating  
0 1 2 3 
Q25. Why do you think that? * If participant says that it will affect many areas of their life, but doesn’t 
elaborate, prompt with “such as?” 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………   3  
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Q.26. If you were found not guilty, how much do you think it will affect your 
life? 
 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a lot A great 
deal 
0 1 2 3 
Q27. Why do you think that? * If participant says that it will affect many areas of their life, but doesn’t 
elaborate, prompt with “such as?” 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….3  
Q28. What sentence would you expect to receive if found guilty? *If participant says it 
depends on whether they had a knife or not, but only gives one sentence, prompt for a sentence for both with a knife and without 
a knife. If participant says depends on previous convictions, answer based on a clean record. (i.e. they are a person of good 
character). 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 
 
Q29. Why would you expect that 
sentence?…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………3  
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Appendix 6: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
                    Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
                    www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
+44 (0) 1784 443526 
PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
Information Sheet 
 
   Exploration of the lay understanding of the court process  
 
My name is Maeve Wallace and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. I am carrying out a study which will be looking 
at individuals’ understanding of the court process, as well as a short test on 
reasoning using patterns. This project is being supervised by Dr. Simone Fox 
and Dr. Emily Glorney.  
 
Your participation will contribute to the development of a tool which will be 
used by clinicians in determining whether an individual is capable of standing 
trial.  
 
If you decide to take part, I will ask you to watch a short video of a fictional 
courtroom scenario and will ask you some questions about what you have 
seen. I will also ask you to complete a short test of pattern recognition. This 
will take around one hour and will take place in the Department of 
Psychology. Nobody except myself and my supervisors will be allowed to see 
responses and in the study you will be known only by a number, to ensure 
that your information remains completely confidential.   
 
You have the right to refuse to take part in this study and to withdraw at any 
point should you wish to do so.   
 
Please keep this sheet for your own reference. Please feel free to ask any 
questions before you complete the consent form overleaf. It will be stored 
separately from the anonymous information you provide for the research 
project. This study has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology 
Department’s ethics panel at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research, you can contact me by 
email at Maeve.Wallace.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk or by phone on 01784 414012.  
 
Thank you in advance for your participation,  
 
Maeve Wallace 
          Trainee Clinical Psychologist  
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Appendix 7: Consent Form 
 
 Consent form                                                    
 
You have been asked to participate in this study, which is being carried out by 
Maeve Wallace. 
 
Have you (please circle yes or no): 
 
• Read the information sheet about the study? yes no 
• Had an opportunity to ask questions? yes no 
• Got satisfactory answers to your questions? yes no 
• Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study 
           at any time, without giving a reason  yes no 
(and without it affecting your education if applicable)?  
 
      Do you agree to take part in the study ? yes no 
  
                Signature: _______________________________            
 
                Name in block letters: __________________________________   
 
                Date: ________________  
 
 
 
NB: This consent form will be stored separately from the anonymous 
information you provide.   
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Appendix 8: Participant Demographics sheet 
 
 
 
                 Department of Psychology 
                 Royal Holloway, University of London 
                 Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
                 www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
 
 
 
+44 (0) 1784 443526 
PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic profile 
 
 
Please note, all responses to the below are completely confidential.  
 
Age: 
 
Gender: 
 
RHUL Course: 
 
Any current or previous involvement with the criminal justice system, for 
example, as a victim or a defendant in court proceedings, or as a jury 
member? 
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Appendix 9: Testing Instructions for Participants 
      
                 Department of Psychology 
                Royal Holloway, University of London 
                Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
                 www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
 
                   +44 (0) 1784 443526 
               PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
  
 
 
Please read the information below:  
NB: There are two different sets of instructions for this research. You will 
either receive Instructions A or Instructions B.  
I, the researcher, do not know which instructions you have received so if you 
could please try to follow the instructions WITHOUT letting me know which set 
you have received.  
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